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Labor Pains: Why Contraction Is Not the 
Solution to Major League Baseballs 
Competitive Balance Problems 
Bryan Day* 
 
Two years ago, Kansas City was the site of a large-scale protest 
that made headlines across the nation.1  Thousands of participants 
united in a massive march that went off peacefully and was deemed a 
success.2  Surprisingly, however, this particular demonstration was 
not over traditional hot topics such as animal rights or corporate 
globalization3―no, it was inspired by baseball.4  To protest the 
inequity between large- and small-revenue baseball franchises, 
thousands of Kansas City Royals fans descended on Kauffman 
Stadium, the site of an early season game between the financially 
barren Royals and the ultra-rich New York Yankees.5  The protesters 
marched to the Stadium wearing T-shirts that read, $hare The 
Wealth and greeted the Yankees team bus by waving dollar bills at 
the players.6  Once the game started, the protesting fans turned their 
 
* Bryan Day received his B.A. at Tulane University and his J.D. at Boston College Law 
School.  He is a lawyer in the legal department for the Salt Lake Organizing Committee. 
 1 See Dennis Dodd, Baseball Inequity a Big Deal for Small Markets, 
CBS.SPORTSLINE.COM (Apr. 28, 1999) (stating that the Associated Press, The New         
York Times, USA Today, and several other newspapers ran the story of                         
Kansas Citys fan protest against the New York Yankees), at 
http://www.cbs.sportsline.com/u/ce/multi/0,1329,967091_52,00.html (last visited Jan. 31, 
2002). 
 2 See id.; Buster Olney, Torre Not Ready to Manage Yanks; Zimmer to Stay On, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 1, 1999 (describing how about 2,000 fans staged a protest and walked out in the 
fourth inning during a baseball game between the New York Yankees and the Kansas City 
Royals). 
 3 See Dodd, supra note 1 (explaining that sports radio talk show host Kevin Kietzman 
organized a walkout during the Kansas City Royals-New York Yankees game on April 30, 
1999 to protest the inequity between large and small market franchises in Major League 
Baseball). 
 4 See id. 
 5 See Olney, supra note 2 (describing the demonstration staged by Kansas City Royals 
fans to protests the financial and competitive disparity between large and small market 
franchises). 
 6 See id. (detailing how fans greeted the Yankees outside Kauffman Stadium chanting 
Share The Wealth and waving one-dollar bills). 
DAY.FINAL 2/15/02  2:57 PM 
522 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 12 
 
backs to the field while the Yankees batted.7  Finally, after the first 
out of the fourth inning, the protesters left the stadium en masse, but 
not before taping paper skeletons to their seats that read, Small 
markets are dying.8 
Royals fans are not the only ones disillusioned with the current 
state of Major League Baseball (hereinafter MLB), where large-
revenue teams like the Yankees dominate.  Minnesota Twins fans 
certainly understand just how MLB has changed in a small period of 
time.9  From opening day 1987 to the day the 1994 players strike 
began, the Twins won two world championships, and set an 
American League attendance record outdrawing even the Yankees.10  
Since the strike, the Twins have finished in last place, had six losing 
seasons, tried to move to North Carolina, lost their best player to 
glaucoma and been occasionally outdrawn by the St. Paul Saints, an 
independent league team with a pig mascot.11 
The Montreal Expos also understand baseballs current ills.  Back 
in 1982, Montreal led the National League in attendance with 2.3 
million fans.12  Twelve years later, a star-studded Expos squad 
entered August with the best record in baseball.13  Unfortunately, the 
 
 7 Id. 
 8 See id. (stating that the protesters departed en masse during the top of the fourth 
inning). 
 9 See Sean McAdam, The Rich Get Richer, ESPN.COM (Feb. 1999) (describing how the 
Twins went from World Series Champions to perennial loser in less than a decade), at 
http://www.spfldcol.edu/Faculty.nsf/79932f4124ead269852567240054ad7f/9fdecb84ab0e9
206852568b6005b693f?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). 
 10 See id. 
 11 See The Glaucoma Foundation, The Glaucoma Foundation Congratulates Kirby 
Puckett (noting, upon his election to the Hall of Fame, that Kirby Puckett was forced to 
retire from baseball as a result of glaucoma), at http://www.glaucoma-
foundation.org/features/kpinduction.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2002); Press Release, Northern 
League Sets Attendance Records in 1999 (Dec. 28, 1999) (reporting that [t]he Saints sold 
out all 42 dates, posting a per game average of 6,329, the highest mark in independent 
baseball.), available at http://www.northernleague.com/releases/122899.html (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2002); St. Paul Saints (referring to their pig mascot, known as Kevin Bacon.), at 
http://www.spsaints.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). 
 12 See Chris Isidore, Why Out is the Wrong Call, CNNFN.COM (Oct. 5, 2001), at 
http://money.cnn.com/2001/10/05/living/column_sportsbiz (last visited Jan. 31, 2002). 
 13 See Hal Bodley, Will Expos Bid Adieu to Canada?, USA TODAY, Nov. 6, 2001, at 4C 
(stating that the Montreal Expos had the best record in August 1994 when the players strike 
began). 
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strike wiped out the end of that season along with any hope Montreal 
had of postseason success.14  Post-strike economics forced the club 
to unload premier players such as Pedro Martinez, John Wetteland, 
Larry Walker and Moises Alou, and as a result the team plummeted 
in the standings.15  It became increasingly obvious that the Expos had 
turned into a glorified Triple-A team, and fan apathy soon 
followed.16  During this past season the club had its lowest home 
attendance ever, averaging only 7,648 paying fans per home game.17  
Thirteen minor league clubs, including major markets such as 
Round Rock, Texas and Kane County, Illinois, drew more fans on a 
typical night than the Expos.18  Montreal no longer cares about the 
Expos, leading to an uncomfortable situation for the teams players.19  
As current Expo Geoff Blum noted, Its frustrating when youre 
trying to get into a game and theres 3,000 people. . . .  When theres 
3,000, you can hear every boo, every put-down that comes from the 
stands.20 
Such is the state of the game today.  Baseball should be in a 
renaissance period, sparked by one of the best World Series ever, 
record-breaking performances by Barry Bonds and the Seattle 
Mariners, and touching farewells to Cal Ripken, Jr., Tony Gwynn, 
and Mark McGwire.21  Unfortunately, despite these memorable 
events, the growing chasm between low-revenue teams and their 
wealthy compatriots is a curse upon the national pastime that wont 
go away. Competitive imbalance is undermining the game, as 
 
 14 See id. (stating that the players strike in 1994 put an end to one of the Montreal 
Expos best seasons). 
 15 Id. 
 16 See Scott Samples, Best year? Some Points to Ponder, PRESS J., Dec. 28, 1998, at B1 
(The best year ever in sports? Not when teams like . . . the Montreal Exposproud teams 
who were title contenders just a few short years agoare reduced to glorified Triple-A 
franchises because they cant afford to cough out wads of dough like big-market teams.). 
 17 See Isidore, supra note 12. 
 18 See id. 
 19 See Bill Beacon, Expos Play Final Home Game Wondering if Theyll Be Back Next 
Year, CANADIAN PRESS, Sept. 27, 2001, available at 2001 WL 28545182 (noting that some 
Expos veterans are affected by the apathy and/or negativity of Montreal fans). 
 20 Id. 
 21 See Paul White, Is 2002 Doomed to Fall Short?, BASEBALL WEEKLY, Jan. 9, 2002, at 
4 (noting the concurrence of events that made the 2001 season memorable). 
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Americas most beloved sport has evolved into an unfair system of 
haves and have-nots. 
In an attempt to fix baseballs current ailments, team owners 
recently announced a plan to eliminate two struggling franchises 
before the start of the 2002 season.22  Although specific clubs were 
not identified, not surprisingly the aforementioned Twins and Expos 
seem to be the two franchises in MLBs crosshairs.23  While drastic 
action is necessary to restore competitive balance to baseball, 
contraction most certainly is not the answer. This article first 
addresses the games biggest problem, competitive imbalance, and 
explains how the current economic system creates a situation in 
which only a few teams have realistic chances of winning the World 
Series.  Next, the owners contraction proposal, or lack thereof, is 
analyzed.  The legal headaches that contraction creates are then 
reviewed, followed by a close look at the practical problems 
created by the plan.  Finally, a recommendation is made that 
contraction be scrapped once and for all, and real solutions that 
would solve baseballs competitive balance problems be 
implemented instead. 
I.  COMPETITIVE IMBALANCE AND THE SYSTEM THAT CREATES IT 
Major League Baseball clearly has some serious issues to confront 
in order to improve the state of the game.  Among the many 
problems that need to be addressed, competitive imbalance is the 
most important.  Fortunately, identifying the root of competitive 
imbalance is not difficult.  Under baseballs current economic 
system, great disparities in local revenues lead to great disparities in 
club payrolls, which in turn ensure that certain franchises will have 
no chance to be competitive on the field.24 
 
 22 See Ken Daley, Baseball Owners Vote to Cut Two Teams, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, 
Nov. 7, 2001, at 1A (explaining that on November 6, 2001, the owners of Major League 
Baseball voted to eliminate two of the financially weakest franchises prior to the start of the 
next season). 
 23 See id. (citing ownership sources who indicated that the Montreal Expos and 
Minnesota Twins will be the two teams to be eliminated). 
 24 The Report of the Independent Members of the Commissioners Blue Ribbon Panel 
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A. Competitive Imbalance 
Baseball fans used to subscribe to the theory that hope springs 
eternal.25  Even if their beloved team endured a disastrous year, the 
fans rallying cry was always wait til next year, as a new season 
brought renewed hope.26  Unfortunately, you will not hear too many 
cries of wait til next year these days from fans in cities like 
Montreal, Kansas City, Tampa Bay, and Pittsburgh.  The sad state of 
todays game is a recent phenomenon, whereas in the past bad teams 
stayed bad only because they were ineptly run.27  With new 
management and a fresh approach, anything was possible, and fans 
knew that if they persevered, their faith eventually would be 
rewarded.28  Obviously, such is not the case now.  The Yankees, with 
their endless revenue streams and post-strike success on the field, 
have become popular targets for those concerned with the state of the 
game.  However, baseballs big problem these days is not that the 
Yankees are a virtual juggernaut; the dilemma is that so many other 
clubs have no chance to compete.  As the Blue Ribbon Panel on 
Baseball Economics pointed out, modern day baseball is now 
essentially divided into three groups of unequal size: 1) clubs that 
expect to perform well in the postseason; 2) clubs that hope for an 
occasional dream season to reach the postseason; and 3) clubs that 
know going into spring training that they will not make the 
playoffs.29 
 
on Baseball Economics, July 2000 (R. Levin, G. Mitchell, P. Volcker, G. Will) [hereinafter 
Blue Ribbon Panel] (on file with author) (noting that many teams enter spring training 
knowing that their chances of reaching the postseason are virtually nonexistent).  The Panel 
was comprised of Yale University President Richard C. Levin, former Senate Majority 
Leader George J. Mitchell, political commentator George F. Will, and former Federal 
Reserve Chair Paul A. Volcker. 
 25 See id. at 13 (One of baseballs oldest and cherished notions is that hope springs 
eternal, and that every club is a contender at least in spring training.  If a clubs season 
ended in futility, the fans rallying cry was always, Wait til next year, because a new 
season always brought renewed hope.). 
 26 See id. 
 27 See Frank Blackman, Brother, Can You Spare A Dime? Baseballs Haves Are 
Running Circles Around Have-Nots, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 25, 1999, at B1. 
 28 See id. 
 29 See Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 12. 
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It was not always this way, as one need only look back a few years 
to see the game in a healthier state.30 During the 1980s nine different 
teams won the World Series (only the Dodgers repeated), and only 
two teams managed to win consecutive division titles (Kansas City in 
1984 and 1985, Oakland in 1988 and 1989).31  Before the 1994 
strike, anyone, it seemed, could win, and almost every team did win 
something.32 The Reds, Royals, and As, all current members of 
baseballs low-revenue club, have all won championships in the last 
twenty years.33  The Twins won the World Series in 1987 and 
1991.34  The Pirates won three straight division titles in the early 
nineties.35  In 1994, Montreal had the best record in baseball at the 
time of the strike.36  Unfortunately, as we begin a new millennium, a 
repeat of these achievements seems utterly laughable. 
The absence of competitive balance in baseball has hit the fans of 
the game hard.  Commissioner Bud Selig claims, The two things a 
fan has to have are hope and faith.37 However, even Selig 
reluctantly admits that hope and faith are scarce commodities in 
many cities these days.38  Unless baseball changes the way it does 
business, it risks seeing its fans drift away, tired of their teams 
futility.  Even fans in championship cities do not benefit from 
baseballs lack of competitivenesswhen it becomes obvious that a 
few teams will be perennial winners, excitement in those cities will 
decline.39  For example, a superb Atlanta team, which has won ten 
straight division titles and featured one of the best  pitching  rotations  
 
 30 See Rob Neyer, All about Competition, ESPN.COM, Feb. 5, 1999 (reporting on the 
increasing competitive imbalance over the past few years). 
 31 See id. 
 32 See id. 
 33 See id. 
 34 See Jim Caple, Hankies No Longer for Homers in Twin Cities, ESPN.COM, Feb. 4, 
1999. 
 35 See Mike Vaccaro, For All Baseballs Glory This Year, Selig Still Faces A Budding 
Problem, STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 22, 1998, at 51. 
 36 See id. 
 37 Blackman, supra note 27. 
 38 See id. 
 39 See John Moores, Managers Journal: Bring Competition Back to Baseball, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 5, 1999. 
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in recent memory, could not even sell out all its home games in this 
years National League Championship Series.40 
A reasonably level playing field, on which clubs representing 
markets that are quite diverse geographically, demographically, and 
economically can compete with at least periodic opportunities for 
success, is fundamental to MLBs continued growth and popular 
appeal.41  That opportunity exists in the other major sports.42  Bob 
Costas has pointed out that while the Yankees were in the midst of 
their late-nineties run through Big-Market Baseball, the San Antonio 
Spurs won an NBA title and the Green Bay Packers went to back-to-
back Super Bowls.43  According to Costas, no one in football 
believes that the Packers, from tiny Green Bay, are at a significant 
disadvantage relative to the Giants or Jets, New York Citys entries 
in the NFL.44  Unfortunately, all those associated with baseball know 
that just down the road from Lambeau Field the Milwaukee 
Brewerswith or without a new stadiummight as well be on a 
different planet from the Yankees or Mets.45 
B. What Creates Competitive Imbalance? 
Baseballs current lack of competitive balance can be traced to 
three related concepts:  the  sports  wide  disparity  in  overall  team  
 
 40 See Joseph Duarte, Braves-Diamondbacks Summary, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 22, 
2001, available at 2001 WL 23638325 (stating that although the Atlanta Braves have won 
ten straight division titles, the Braves have failed to sell out nine of the last fifteen home 
playoff games); Jeff Gordon, Looking at Whos In and Whos Out in the World of Sports, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 22, 2001 (stating that the Atlanta Braves did not sell out 
Game Three of the 2001 National League Championship Series); Drew Olson, Trouble 
Ahead for Braves?, MILWAUKEE J. SENT., Oct. 23, 2001 (noting that the Braves failed to sell 
out a single one of their four postseason games in 2001). 
 41 Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 12 (advocating a relatively level playing field 
for teams of different market sizes). 
 42 See BOB COSTAS, FAIR BALL 184 (2000) (arguing there must be some reasonable 
equality of opportunity to build and maintain a contending team for true competition to exist 
and that such reasonable equality of opportunity does not exist in Major League Baseball). 
 43 Id. (comparing the parity that exists in football to its lack in Major League Baseball). 
 44 See id. 
 45 See id. 
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revenues, the correlation between overall revenue and team payroll, 
and the impact that team payroll has on a teams success on the field. 
1. Disparities in Overall Revenues 
Overall club revenues come primarily from three sources: 1) so-
called local revenues . . . 2) Central Fund revenues generated by 
industry-wide contracts, such as national television contracts and 
licensing arrangements . . . and 3) revenue sharing . . .  [which] 
transfers locally generated money from high-revenue clubs to low-
revenue clubs.46 
Local revenues are the largest single component of most clubs 
overall annual revenue.47  Local revenue [streams] consist 
[primarily] of gate receipts, television, radio and cable fees, ballpark 
concessions, advertising and publications, parking, suite rentals, 
postseason, and spring training revenues.48  While the sources of 
revenue vary, for most clubs the largest single source of local 
revenue comes from home-game gate receipts.49  Unlike the NFL, 
which has a sixty-forty home-away split of gate receipts for regular 
season games, baseball allows home clubs to keep 100% of ticket 
profits from their home dates.50  Another significant component of 
local revenue is local broadcasting fees.51  Unlike other professional 
sports, in which a [large] portion of television rights fees are pooled 
and distributed equally among all teams, most MLB television and 
radio rights are negotiated and sold locally in each individual 
market.52  Because local markets vary greatly in size, the local TV 
and radio revenues flowing to each club vary in size by large 
 
 46 Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 15 (detailing the sources of club revenues). 
 47 See id. at 17 (stating that local revenue constituted approximately 79% of total 
industry revenue from 1996 to 1999). 
 48 Id. at 59 (listing the sources of local revenue). 
 49 See Major League Baseball 2001 Consolidated Industry Forecast [hereinafter 2001 
Forecast], available at http://www.mlb.com/mlb/hearings/downloads/overview.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2002). 
 50 See COSTAS, supra note 42, at 55. 
 51 See Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 18. 
 52 Id. 
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amounts.53  Media market rank also affects other local revenues 
available to clubs, including the amount they can charge for ballpark 
naming rights, signage, sponsorships, and other revenue 
producers.54 
Central Fund revenue, the second component of a clubs overall 
revenue, is the money distributed [by MLB] to clubs from national 
licensing fees.55  This revenue has historically been distributed 
equally to all clubs, and in 2001 all clubs (with the exception of 
recent expansion teams Arizona and Tampa Bay) received $24.401 
million in Central Fund payments.56  Due in large part to MLBs 
current six-year, $2.5-billion national television contract with Fox 
and six-year, $850-million cable deal with ESPN, Central Fund 
distributions have risen every year, but not as quickly as the local 
revenues of some of the richest clubs.57  The converse is true as 
wellCentral Fund distributions now are a primary source of 
revenue for small market teams unable to generate sufficient local 
revenue.58  In fact, in 2001 the poverty-stricken Expos made 
approximately $15 million more from their portion of the Central 
Fund than from all of their local revenues combined.59 
In an attempt to negate the effects of this disadvantage to small-
market teams, baseball instituted a modest revenue-sharing 
arrangement in 1996.60  Revenue-sharing payments currently 
constitute the third and final portion of a clubs overall revenue.61  
During the 2001 season, approximately $167 million in local revenue 
was sent from the top revenue producers to their poorer brethren.62  
Under the current system, every club places 20% of its local revenue 
 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 19. 
 55 Id. at 59. 
 56 See 2001 Forecast, supra note 49. 
 57 See Richard Tedesco, MLB Blues: TV Black Eye?, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 
12, 2001, at 36 (reporting on the television contracts of Major League Baseball). 
 58 See Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 21. 
 59 See 2001 Forecast, supra note 49. 
 60 See Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 21. 
 61 See id. at 15. 
 62 See 2001 Forecast, supra note 49 (reporting the transfer mandated by the current 
revenue-sharing plan). 
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into a pool.63  While 75% of this pool is redistributed evenly among 
the clubs, the remaining 25% is divided among some clubs on a 
sliding scale.64  The only clubs eligible for this sliding scale payment 
are those that generated less local operating revenue than that 
seasons league-wide average.65 
A comparison between the high-revenue Yankees and low-revenue 
Expos demonstrates the great disparity in overall revenue.  As noted 
above, local revenue streams are, for most teams, the largest single 
component of overall revenue.66  In 2001, the Yankees generated 
over $217 million in local revenues, while the Expos could only 
manage $9.7 million.67 This figure is not at all surprising, as the 
Yankees lucrative local television, radio, and cable deal was worth 
nearly $57 million, while the Expos could only manage $536,000 for 
their local broadcast rights.68  Like the rest of the non-expansion 
clubs, both the Yankees and Expos received $24.401 million from 
MLBs Central Fund.69  Revenue sharing, meanwhile, took a chunk 
out of the Yankees revenues and added to Montreals bottom line.70  
In 2001, the Yankees were forced to contribute $26.54 million to the 
revenue-sharing pool, while the Expos were on the receiving end of a 
$28.517 million payment.71  Therefore, when accounting for local 
revenue, Central Fund payments, and revenue sharing, the Yankees 
final 2001 overall revenue stood at over $215 million, while the 
Expos overall revenue totaled $62.69 million.72 
 
 63 See Mychael Urban, Revenue Sharing: How It Works, Is It Working?, MLB.COM 
(Dec. 6, 2001) (describing the current formulation by the league mandating that every team 
put 20% of its local revenue into a pool, 75% of which is redistributed evenly among the 
thirty teams, with the remaining 25% to be divided on a sliding scale among those teams 
generating revenues less than the league-wide average), at 
http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/mlb_news_story.jsp?article_id=mlb_2001120
6_urban2_news&team_id=mlb (last visited Feb. 11, 2002). 
 64 See id. 
 65 See id. 
 66 See Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 17 (noting the relative importance of local 
revenue streams). 
 67 See 2001 Forecast, supra note 49. 
 68 See id. 
 69 See id. 
 70 See id. 
 71 See id. 
 72 See 2001 Forecast, supra note 49. 
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2. The Correlation Between Overall Revenue and Team Payroll 
The amount of a clubs overall revenue is a key factor in 
determining the amount of that clubs payroll.73  Therefore, the 
increase in club revenue disparity has been mirrored by a similar 
disparity in team payrolls.74  For example, back in 1995 the top 
quarter of revenue-producing teams had an average team payroll of 
$43.86 million while the bottom quarter of revenue producers 
averaged a team payroll of $21.92 million.75  Although this 2:1 ratio 
does create a distinct advantage for the top revenue-producing clubs, 
a similar level of payroll disparity exists in the NFL and NBA.76  By 
1999, however, the top quarter of revenue producers averaged a team 
payroll of $71.86 million while the bottom quarter of teams averaged 
$26.13 million.77  This 3:1 payroll advantage for high-revenue clubs 
creates serious inequities.78  Since the Blue Ribbon Panel released 
these figures, things have only grown worse.  As a demonstration of 
this, the Yankees, traditionally the sports highest revenue producer, 
had a team payroll nearly four times greater than the low-revenue 
Twins in 2001.79 
There are four key reasons why a teams payroll is strongly related 
to its overall revenue.80  First of all, higher revenue clubs have the 
financial resources and thus a better opportunity to sign high-
salaried free agents from other clubs.81 Low revenue teams have 
little hope of immediate improvement, since, due to overwhelming 
financial constraints, they have lost the ability to sign any of the 
 
 73 See Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 25 (noting that revenue is the starting point 
for clubs when deciding how much they can spend on player salaries). 
 74 See id. (noting that payroll disparity is a logical outgrowth of revenue disparity). 
 75 See id. 
 76 See COSTAS, supra note 42, at 95 (stating that no single National Football League or 
National Basketball Association team has a payroll more than double that of its 
competitors). 
 77 See Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 25. 
 78 See id. 
 79 See 2001 Forecast, supra note 49. 
 80 See Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 26 (detailing the relationship between 
revenue and payroll). 
 81 Id. 
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sports top free agents.82  As an example, this past year the Yankees, 
traditionally the most aggressive team in the free agent market, had 
ten players on their roster earning $6 million or more.83  At the other 
end of the spectrum, the Twins and Royals each had just one player 
making over $6 million.84  With the current top free agents seeking 
deals worth between $10 and $20 million per year, low-revenue 
clubs have lost any hope of signing an established superstar.85  The 
rich teams essentially decide who among them will sign the games 
best players when they become available, as they are the only ones 
capable of entering the bidding.86 
The second reason that club payroll is so heavily influenced by 
overall revenue is a clubs ability to retain their own high-salaried 
players.87 Even if a low-revenue club does develop a potential 
superstar, he likely will leave after six years, when he is eligible to 
become a free agent and can accept a huge offer his original team is 
unable to match.88  Low-rent teams are in effect becoming farm 
teams for the games plutocrats, a notion demonstrated by Oaklands 
current plight.  The As had the fifth-lowest payroll in baseball last 
year and were sixth from the bottom in overall revenue generated.89  
Nevertheless, solid management over the years helped create a 
young, successful team that finished the regular season with 
baseballs second best record.90  First baseman Jason Giambi, the 
 
 82 See id. 
 83 See Amy Shipley, Major League Baseball Enters Foul Territory, WASH. POST, Nov. 
11, 2001, at D1 (stating that the Yankees $125 million payroll includes ten players each 
earning at least $6 million per season). 
 84 See id. (contrasting the Yankees wealthy payroll to that of lower-wealth teams 
including the Minnesota Twins and Kansas City Royals who each have only one player on 
their payroll making over $6 million). 
 85 See Baseball Winter Meetings, A Look At Whos Available, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 
11, 2001, at 74 (reporting on the most sought-after free agents and their projected salaries). 
 86 See McAdam, supra note 9. 
 87 Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 26. 
 88 See Blackman, supra note 27 (describing the disparity in teams ability to bid for 
superstar players leading to the wealthy teams monopolizing the free agent market as the 
poorer teams are generally incapable of entering the bidding and as a result once a player 
becomes a free agent he will often leave his team for the highest bidding team). 
 89 See 2001 Forecast, supra note 49. 
 90 See Susan Slusser, As Rode Roller Coaster to Earn Wild-Card Berth, S.F. CHRON., 
Oct. 2, 2001, at E1 (chronicling the teams up-and-down year that concluded in a postseason 
match-up with the Yankees). 
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2000 AL MVP, closer Jason Isringhausen, and outfielder Johnny 
Damon all played key roles in Oaklands success, but, sadly for the 
As, once the season ended they all became free agents.91  
Predictably, the low revenue As lost all three players to wealthier 
clubs.92  Isringhausen signed a four-year, $27-million deal with the 
St. Louis Cardinals, and Giambi signed a huge seven-year contract 
with the Yankees.93  It was only a matter of time before Damon 
followed his former teammates out of Oakland, as he had made it 
clear that he would consider staying with the As only if the team re-
signed Giambi.94  Damon should have known better, as based on the 
clubs financial plight there was no way that the As could afford to 
re-sign two of the hottest commodities in baseball. 
Team payroll is also affected by overall revenue due to the fact 
that low-revenue clubs are unlikely even to attempt to enter the 
bidding for high-priced international free agents.95 Under the Major 
League Rules, only players from the U.S., Canada, Puerto Rico and 
other U.S. territories are eligible for selection in the First Year Player 
Draft.96  In recent years, though, international talent has begun to 
flow into the game.97  Players from the Far East, Australia, the 
 
 91 See Eric Gilmore, Loss of Giambi Wont Derail As, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Dec. 29, 
2001. 
 92 See Free Agent Scorecard (reporting the departures from the Oakland Athletics of 
Johnny Damon, Jason Giambi, and Jason Isringhausen), at 
http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/events/freeagent2001/mlb_free_agent_scorecard.js
p (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). 
 93 See Mark Feinsand, Its Official: Giambi a Yankee; Slugger Signs Seven-             
Year Deal, MLB.COM (Dec. 13, 2001) (reporting Jason Giambis seven-                          
year, $120 million contract with the New York Yankees), at 
http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/mlb_news_story.jsp?article_id=mlb_2001121
3_giambi_news&team_id=mlb (last visited Jan. 31, 2002); see also Patrick Mulrenin, Cards 
Close the Deal on Isringhausen, MLB.COM (Dec. 10, 2001) (reporting Jason Isringhausens 
signing of a four-year contract with the St. Louis Cardinals), at 
http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/mlb_news_story.jsp?article_id=mlb_2001121
0_isringhausensigns_news&team_id=stl (last visited Jan. 31, 2002). 
 94 See Mychael Urban, Damon Signs with Red Sox; Free-Agent Outfielder Ends One-
Year Stint with As, MLB.COM (Dec. 21, 2001) (noting the snowball effect that             
occurs when a team is unable to retain a high-profile free agent), at 
http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/mlb_news_story.jsp?article_id=oak_2001122
1_damongone_news&team_id=oak (last visited Feb. 10, 2002). 
 95 See Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 26. 
 96 See id. at 41. 
 97 Sean McAdam, Looking For Answers, ESPN.COM (Feb. 4, 1999) (advocating a 
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Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and Cuba, all exempt from the 
draft, have migrated to the U.S., making a dramatic impact on the 
game.98  Unfortunately, the international market prices out the small-
revenue teams in much the same way the free agent market does.99  
Its getting to the point now, Oakland General Manager Billy 
Beane has said, where the best foreign players go to big-market 
teams because agents recruit kids, then hold a tryout where the 
highest bidder gets his services.100  Thats exactly what happened 
when Orlando El Duque Hernandez fled Cuba.101  When 
Hernandezs agent arranged a workout in Costa Rica to showcase the 
pitcher, As scouting director Grady Fuson called Beane to find out 
whether he should go.102  I asked Grady if he knew what clubs were 
going, Beane said.  Would the Yankees and Braves be there?  If 
those guys are going down there, why waste the money?  If he can 
play, were not going to get him.  Those clubs will just outbid us.  If 
he cant play, we spent $2,000 for nothing.103  So the As stayed 
home, Hernandez signed a lucrative deal with the Yankees, and El 
Duque led the Bronx Bombers to three World Series triumphs in his 
first three seasons.104 
Finally, overall revenues effect on team payroll can be seen with 
low-revenue clubs attempts to sign top prospects selected from the 
First Year Player Draft.105  Baseballs current draft system enables 
rich, powerful teams to become even richer and more powerful by 
cornering the young talent pool.106  The Rule 4 draft, originally 
designed in the early 1960s to distribute the best new talent to poorly 
 
world-wide draft). 
 98 See id. 
 99 See id. 
 100 See Blackman, supra note 27 (describing the decrease in the poorer teams ability to 
recruit foreign players who were once a cheap and reliable talent source which is now 
inundated by the higher bidding potential of the wealthier teams). 
 101 See id. 
 102 See id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 See id. (noting the great impact international players can have on the success of a 
team that can afford to bid for their services). 
 105 See Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 26 (noting the difficulty low-revenue teams 
have in signing the premium players they draft). 
 106 See id. 
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performing clubs, has evolved into an inefficient mechanism with 
perverse effects.107  High-revenue clubs now have a significant 
advantage in the acquisition of first-year players, as the spiraling cost 
of signing players has moved the focus of the draft from assessing 
talent to assessing signability.108  An example from the 1998 draft 
best illustrates this point.109  The As had the second pick in that 
seasons draft and, if their decision had been based on talent, 
outfielder J.D. Drew was the obvious choice.110  There was a 
problem, though.  At the urging of agent Scott Boras, Drew had 
refused a $4-million offer from Philadelphia the year before, instead 
choosing to hold out and play in an independent pro league.111  This 
time around, the Phillies, who had the top pick, passed, not willing to 
be burned twice in a row.112  The As were next but also passed on 
Drew, opting to draft left-hander pitcher Mark Mulder.113  The As 
could not afford to meet Drews demands either.114  When the White 
Sox also passed, it seemed possible baseball might be willing to 
teach Drew and Boras a lesson about greed, but St. Louis, selecting 
fourth, chose Drew and quickly signed him for $7 million.115  Drews 
signing also skewed the entire draft, because if he was worth $7 
million, then the No. 1 pick was not going to settle for less.116  The 
top pick wound up getting a package worth $8 million, which also 
meant the No. 2 pick could now demand substantially more.117  The 
As were forced to invest more than $4 million in Mulder, even 
though pitchers traditionally are the riskiest selections in the draft 
and some of the money could have been spent improving the big-
league roster.118  Thus, not only did the low-revenue As pass on 
what  was  widely  considered  the  best  player  available,  they were  
 
 107 Id. at 41. 
 108 See id. 
 109 See Blackman, supra note 27. 
 110 See id. 
 111 See id. 
 112 See id. 
 113 See id. 
 114 See id. 
 115 See Blackman, supra note 27. 
 116 See id. 
 117 See id. 
 118 See id. 
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forced to overpay their less heralded selection (although Mulder has 
certainly proved that he was worth every penny).119 
C. The Correlation Between Team Payroll and On-Field Success 
The . . . number of games won is . . . closely related to the clubs 
payroll.  That is, the higher the payroll, the more games a club is 
likely to win.120  Occasionally, a low payroll club like the As does 
well on the field, and, as the Baltimore Orioles made a habit of 
proving in years past, high payroll clubs can certainly flop on the 
field.121  [W]hile it is evident that a high payroll is not the only 
element in fielding a winning clubchemistry, scouting, and 
management are factors as wellit is an increasingly important 
element.122  Put another way, a high payroll does not automatically 
guarantee a good win-loss record and a contending season, but a low 
payroll usually means that a club cannot contend for a postseason 
berth or championship.123  Selig admitted as much when he testified 
that baseballs postseason continues to be dominated by high 
payroll clubs. . . .  [I]n the playoffs, the payroll and performance 
correlation is unmistakable and powerful.124 
The correlation between team win percentage and team payroll has 
been significant at the highest statistical level every year between 
1995 and 2001.125  In contrast, the correlation was not significant at 
 
 119 It should be noted that although Mulder was less heralded in that years draft, he has 
turned out to be a quality selection for the As.  In 2001, Mulder finished in second place in 
the voting for the Cy Young Award.  Drew, on the other hand, has produced solid numbers 
for the Cardinals but has spent much of his young career on the disabled list. 
 120 Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 29. 
 121 See Jack Etkin, Labor Pains; If History is Any Guide, Dont Expect Kid-Gloves 
Treatment in Talks for a New Basic Agreement, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 24, 2001, at 
1E (pointing out the occasional aberrations in this payroll-success relationship). 
 122 Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 29. 
 123 Id. 
 124 For the Leagues official stance on this issue, see Press Release, Major League 
Baseball, Major League Baseball Competitive Balance Worsens (Dec. 6, 2001), available at 
http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/mlb_news_story.jsp?GXHC_gx_session_id_
=6c5e1bdd1e32ccfd&GXHC_GX_jst=fc7b64f0662d6163&article_id=mlb_20011206_com
petitivebalance_pr&team_id=mlb (last visited Jan. 31, 2002). 
 125 Andrew Zimbalist, Foreword to BOB COSTAS, FAIR BALL xv (2000) (tracking the 
DAY.FINAL 2/15/02  2:57 PM 
2002] CONTRACTION & MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 537 
 
this level in any year between 1985 and 1994.126  Over the seven-
year period since the strike, no team outside of the top quarter in 
payroll has won a single World Series game.127  Teams in the bottom 
half of payroll have won only five of the 224 postseason contests that 
have taken place since the strike, with four of these victories 
achieved by the same club, Oakland.128  No team in the bottom half 
of team payroll during this period actually won a postseason 
series.129  Over this span, thirteen out of fourteen World Series 
participants have been in the top eight in league payroll.130  Spending 
a truckload on player salaries doesnt guarantee success, but it sure 
helps.  As a result, a perennial marketing description for low revenue 
clubs is young and exciting, which in many cases is simply a 
euphemism for a 100-game loser.131  The myth of opening day, 
where anyone can win a title, lays exposed as a lie.132 
II.  CONTRACTION: THE PROPOSAL 
Two years ago, when the Blue Ribbon Panel tried to formulate 
solutions on how to increase competitive balance in baseball, they 
were presented with a unique idea by Colorado Rockies owner Jerry 
McMorris.133  Looking back, McMorris recalls, I just didnt 
understand why we continued to spread the money to places that 
 
correlation). 
 126 See id. 
 127 Seligs Testimony Submitted in Advance; Testimony of Allan                                      
H. (Bud) Selig, Commissioner of Baseball, Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary   
United States House of Rep., MLB.COM (Dec. 6, 2001), available at 
http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/mlb_news_story.jsp?article_id=mlb_2001120
6_seligtestimony_news&team_id=min (last visited Feb. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Selig 
Testimony]. 
 128 See id. 
 129 See id. 
 130 See Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 33-35 (presenting this information in table 
form). 
 131 See Ronald Blum, L.A.s $105 Million Deal For Brown Has Small-Market Teams 
Demanding Change, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 24, 1999, at B9. 
 132 See Mike Vaccaro, Megabucks: Salaries Send Baseball Spinning, TIMES-PICAYUNE 
(New Orleans), Dec. 27, 1998, at C1. 
 133 See Mike Klis, McMorris Idea Now Hottest Topic, DENVER POST, Nov. 4, 2001, at 
C05 (reporting on the introduction of the idea of contraction). 
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continuously showed they dont have the type of support you need 
for baseball to survive.134  The proposal, of course, was to simply 
eliminate the sports weakest franchises.135  Although it took a while 
for contraction, as it became known, to catch on, Selig, a one-time 
critic of the proposal, changed his tune this year and became its 
biggest proponent.136 
Both the American and National League constitutions have 
language that governs the elimination of teams, dictating that any 
member may withdraw from membership with the consent of three-
fourths of all members.137  However, there has not been contraction 
in the sport in over 100 years.138  Back in 1899 economic concerns 
forced the National League to eliminate four of its twelve franchises, 
as owners of teams in Baltimore, Cleveland, Louisville, and 
Washington, D.C. were bought out by their colleagues for a 
combined sum of $104,000.139  A new league, the American League, 
formed a few years later and jumped at the chance to enter the 
suddenly vacant Cleveland and Washington markets.140  By 1903, 
both the American and National Leagues featured eight teams and 
enjoyed a period of relative stability.141 
Nearly a century later, on November 6, 2001, approximately forty-
eight hours after one of the most incredible World Series ever, 
baseballs owners overwhelmingly voted to authorize Selig to begin 
the process of contracting two teams prior to the start of the 2002 
season.142  According to reports, the vote was twenty-eight to two in 
 
 134 See id. 
 135 See id. 
 136 See Tracy Ringolsby, Addition by Contraction is Still on the Board, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
June 17, 2001, at 123 (noting Commissioner Seligs evolving position on the idea of 
contraction). 
 137 See Michael Grange, Baseball Understands the Logic of Culling, GLOBE & MAIL, 
Nov. 2, 2001, Sports, at 2 (describing the withdrawal provisions contained in the American 
and National League Constitutions). 
 138 See Jay Weiner, Baseball Contraction; The Rise, And Then The Fall, MINNEAPOLIS 
STAR TRIB., Nov. 11, 2001, at 1C. 
 139 See id. 
 140 See id. 
 141 See id. 
 142 See Eric Fisher, Commissioner Concedes There Will Be Potholes, WASH. TIMES, 
Nov. 8, 2001, at C1. 
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favor of contraction, with the owners of the Twins and Expos the 
only no votes.143  Although Selig remained vague on specific 
details of the proposal, it seems clear that the Twins and Expos are 
the franchises most likely to be eliminated.144  Initial reports 
predicted that the owners would expand team rosters in order to 
make up for the loss of union jobs, but it now appears as though the 
owners are not willing to offer this concession.145  It has also been 
speculated that players from the contracted teams would enter a 
dispersal draft, with selection order determined by cumulative record 
over the past three years (this years record counting for 50%, last 
years 30%, and 1999 records 20%).146 
The fact that the owners would vote for such a drastic proposal 
makes it clear that baseball has serious financial issues.  Selig 
admitted as much when he claimed, this action, though difficult, 
should not surprise anyone who is familiar with the economics of the 
game.  Our industry has significant financial problems that we are 
trying to address in a myriad of ways.  Contraction is one step toward 
addressing the industrys problem.147  According to the 
Commissioner, the primary factor for targeting specific teams for 
contraction is an inability to generate sufficient local revenue.148  It 
makes no sense for Major League Baseball to be in markets that 
generate insufficient local revenues to justify the investment in the 
franchise, Selig emphasized.  The teams to be contracted had a 
long record of failing to generate enough revenues to operate a viable 
Major League franchise.149 
 
 143 See Murray Chass, Back to Business: Baseball Votes to Drop Two Teams, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2001, at A1. 
 144 See id. 
 145 See Murray Chass, In Debate Over Contraction, Devil Is Also In The Details, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at S4. 
 146 See id. 
 147 See Press Release, Major League Baseball, Major League Baseball Votes                  
to Contract Two Teams (Nov. 6, 2001), available at 
http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/mlb_news_story.jsp?article_id=tex_2001110
6_contraction_news&team_id=tex (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). 
 148 See id. 
 149 See id. 
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Due to the fact that some teams have difficulty generating 
sufficient local revenue, groups in cities across the nation have been 
courting struggling franchises like the Twins and Expos for years in 
an attempt to lure them into a new market.150  Washington D.C., 
Northern Virginia, Portland, and Las Vegas are just a few of the 
areas that would like to see franchise relocation before contraction.151  
It has been over thirty years since a baseball franchise moved, and 
that streak could continue since the owners appear committed to 
contraction over relocation.152  Although they have not ruled out the 
possibility of franchise relocation in the future, the owners seem set 
in their belief that it is not a solution for the games immediate 
problems.153  According to Selig, Merely transferring existing 
problems to another ownership group or another city would only 
exacerbate the problem, not resolve it. . . .  After long and arduous 
study, we have determined that there is no other acceptable current 
solution but to contract two teams.154 
Selig and the owners have had their way, and contraction is now 
on the table.  Unfortunately, an analysis of the repercussions of this 
plan demonstrates that, all in all, it was a big mistake.  First of all, 
the legal consequences of contraction are bound to stagger the 
industry.  In addition, non-legal practical problems shed serious 
doubt on the feasibility of the proposal. 
III.  LEGAL PROBLEMS WITH CONTRACTION 
After the owners fateful contraction announcement, Selig claimed 
that MLBs lawyers spent thousands of hours studying the legal 
ramifications of contraction.155  Contraction could ultimately lead to 
 
 150 See Roger G. Noll, The Economics of Baseball Contraction, at 1-3 (describing the 
relative feasibility of each of these markets), available at 
siepr.stanford.edu/people/noll_baseball.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). 
 151 See id. 
 152 See Kevin Murphy, Baseball Commissioner Defends Plan to Eliminate Two Teams, 
KAN. CITY STAR, Dec. 7, 2001. 
 153 See Press Release, supra note 147. 
 154 See id. 
 155 See Jose de Jesus Ortiz, Selig Stands Firm as Congress, Courts Get Involved, 
HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 9, 2001, at 6. 
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tens of thousands of billable hours for lawyers across the country, 
since MLB is now facing significant legal roadblocks that make one 
wonder whether the benefit of contraction is truly worth the potential 
costs. 
A. Antitrust Issues 
When it comes to franchise movement, MLB does not function 
like a true free market.156  Baseball has been granted an exemption 
from antitrust laws to which all other businesses in the country are 
subject.157  Therefore, MLB can engage in what would normally be 
considered anti-competitive practices when it comes to franchise 
relocation issues.158  Unfortunately for baseball, its shortsighted 
contraction proposal has led to renewed scrutiny of the games 
traditional antitrust exemption.159 
The United States Supreme Court first carved out the exemption in 
the infamous Federal Baseball decision.160  In 1914, the Federal 
League attempted to challenge the established American and 
National Leagues.161  Due to the increase in competition, the Major 
Leagues agreed to a buyout of all the Federal League clubs, with the 
notable exception of Baltimore.162  Claiming that the major leagues 
broke the Federal League through transactions which amount to 
nothing less than bribery, Baltimores owner alleged that a 
conspiracy among the Major Leagues, in violation of antitrust laws, 
caused his club great damage.163  Writing for the Court, Justice 
 
 156 See Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 5. 
 157 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 
356 (1953); Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Natl League of Profl Baseball Clubs, Inc., 
259 U.S. 200 (1922) (a string of cases either granting or affirming Major League Baseballs 
antitrust exemption). 
 158 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-37 (2001). 
 159 See, e.g., H.R. 3288, 107th Cong. (2001).  This is the bill introduced by Rep. John 
Conyers (D-MI), known as the Fairness in Antitrust in National Sports (FANS) Act, which 
would repeal Major League Baseballs antitrust exemption. 
 160 See Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208-09. 
 161 See id. at 207. 
 162 See id. 
 163 See ROGER ABRAMS, BASEBALL AND THE LAW 56 (1998) (recounting the factual 
circumstances surrounding the Federal Baseball case). 
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Holmes held that because professional baseball was not a subject of 
interstate commerce, the business of providing baseball games for 
profit between clubs of professional players was not within the scope 
of federal antitrust laws.164  Holmes argued that the business of 
baseball was purely a state affair despite the fact that players had to 
cross state lines in order to participate in games.165 
Thirty-one years after Federal Baseball, baseballs antitrust 
exemption once again landed in the Supreme Court.166  George 
Toolson, a pitcher who had signed a contract to play with the 
Yankees, refused to report from one farm club to another.167  
Toolson subsequently claimed that baseballs reserve system violated 
federal antitrust laws.168  In a per curiam decision, the Court 
reaffirmed the outcome of Federal Baseball, but based its decision 
on different grounds.169  The Justices emphasized that baseball had 
been left to develop for thirty years based on the understanding that it 
was not subject to antitrust legislation.170  Congress, which was well 
aware of the controversial Federal Baseball decision, had not seen fit 
to pass legislation that would eliminate the sports exemption.171  In 
an act of passing the buck, the Toolson Court stated that if there are 
evils in this field which now warrant application to it of the antitrust 
laws it should be by legislation.172 
The Supreme Courts most recent look at baseballs antitrust 
exemption came in 1972s Flood v. Kuhn decision.173  Curt Flood, a 
centerfielder traded from the Cardinals to the Phillies without his 
previous knowledge or consent, brought an antitrust suit after being 
refused free agency by Baseball Commisioner Bowie Kuhn.174  The 
 
 164 See Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208-09 (constituting the controversial legal and 
logical steps required to grant an antitrust exemption). 
 165 See id. 
 166 See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953). 
 167 See ABRAMS, supra note 163, at 60. 
 168 See id. 
 169 See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357. 
 170 See id. 
 171 See id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972). 
 174 See id. at 264-66. 
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Supreme Court in Flood held that the longstanding exemption of 
professional baseball from antitrust laws was an established 
aberration, in light of the fact that other interstate professional 
sports were not similarly exempt.175  Nevertheless, because Congress 
has acquiesced to this established aberration, the Court in Flood 
ruled that baseballs exemption was entitled to the benefit of stare 
decisis.176  The Court reaffirmed the notion that any removal of the 
resultant inconsistency would be a matter for legislative, not judicial, 
resolution.177 
Although Flood was the last time the Supreme Court ruled on 
baseballs antitrust exemption, the matter still managed to find its 
way into lower level courts several times during the eighties and 
nineties.178 The great weight of subsequent federal cases held that 
Flood exempts the entire business of baseball from federal and state 
antitrust claims.179  Two cases did emerge, however, in which a 
federal district court and a state supreme court took a different 
interpretation of Flood.180  In Piazza, a Pennsylvania federal district 
court reasoned that stare decisis should be narrowly applied with 
regard to Flood, based on the decisions opening sentence, which 
stated, for the third time in 50 years the Court is asked specifically 
to rule the professional baseball reserve system is within the reach of 
the antitrust laws.181  Based on this language, the court in Piazza 
ruled that the exemption should only be applied to baseballs reserve 
system.182  Therefore, other aspects of the business of baseball, 
such as franchise relocation, were not exempt from antitrust 
legislation.183  Faced with the same facts as in Piazza, the Florida 
Supreme Court in Butterworth also held that baseballs antitrust 
 
 175 See id. at 282. 
 176 See id. 
 177 See id. at 285 (continuing the rationale laid out in Toolson). 
 178 See, e.g., McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 911 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. Wash. 1995); 
Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Minn. Twins Pship v. 
State ex rel. Hatch, 592 N.W. 2d 847 (1999); Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 663 So. 2d 
653 (1995); Butterworth v. Natl League of Profl Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (1994). 
 179 See, e.g., McCoy, 911 F. Supp. at 458. 
 180 See Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 438; Butterworth, 644 So. 2d at 1025. 
 181 See Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 438. 
 182 See id. 
 183 See id. 
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exemption only applied to the reserve system and did not extend to 
relocation of baseball clubs.184 
The Curt Flood Act of 1998 resolved some of the uncertainty 
surrounding baseballs exemption from antitrust laws.185  The Act 
repealed part of the exemption, stating that the business of baseball 
directly relating to or affecting the employment of major league 
baseball players is subject to antitrust laws.186  Significantly, 
however, Congress explicitly stated that the passage of this Act 
does not change the application of the antitrust laws in any other 
context.187  Specifically, the Act stated that courts were not to rely 
on the Act as a basis to change the application of antitrust laws to the 
business of baseball relating to or affecting franchise expansion, 
location or relocation, (and) franchise ownership issues.188 
Despite the fact that the Curt Flood Act reaffirmed baseballs 
antitrust exemption as it relates to franchise relocation, MLB decided 
to push its luck in November with its contraction announcement.  
Reacting to the public outcry that followed the owners decision, 
Congressman John Conyers, Jr., Ranking Member of the House 
Judiciary Committee, joined members of the House and Senate in 
introducing the Fairness in Antitrust in National Sports Act 
better known as the FANS Act.189  H.R. 3288 specifically states, 
[i]t is the purpose of this Act to state that the elimination or 
relocation of major league baseball franchises are covered under the 
antitrust laws.190  In response to MLBs announcement that it would 
eliminate two franchises, Congressman Conyers felt it necessary to 
ensure that anti-competitive decisions by Major League Baseball 
become subject to federal antitrust laws like all other professional 
sports and businesses.191  Conyers stated that [a]ny time 30 of the 
wealthiest and most influential individuals get together behind closed 
 
 184 See Butterworth, 644 So. 2d at 1025. 
 185 See 15 U.S.C. §27a (2001). 
 186 See id. §27a(a). 
 187 See id. §27a(b). 
 188 See id. §27a(b)(3). 
 189 See H.R. 3288, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 190 Id. 
 191 See Press Release, Congressman John Conyers, Jr., Conyers Introduces The Fairness 
in Antitrust in National Sports (FANS) Act (Nov. 14, 2001) (on file with author). 
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doors and agree to reduce output, that cannot be a good thing for 
anyone but the monopolists.  If GM and Ford got together and jointly 
agreed to cut production, people would be outraged.  That is exactly 
what baseball has done.192 
Due to Congresss higher priorities and MLBs lobbying efforts, it 
seems unlikely that the FANS Act will be passed.193  However, if it 
does, the loss of its antitrust exemption as it pertains to contraction 
and franchise relocation would be disastrous for MLB.  As an 
example, assume that MLB finally announces that it is in the process 
of contracting the Twins.  Days later, suppose the FANS Act is 
passed and MLB loses its exemption in the narrow areas of 
relocation and contraction.  The lawsuits against MLB would come 
fast and furious, and the owners would be forced to prove that their 
action to eliminate teams is somehow better for the competitive 
business of the sport.194  Potential plaintiffs would likely counter by 
claiming the decision to contract constitutes an agreement among all 
teams to limit output and competition while having no positive 
impact on competition.195 
The number of parties with potential claims against MLB could be 
endless.  In Minnesota, the city and stadium owners would no doubt 
claim that they had been injured because the antitrust conspiracy by 
baseballs owners took away their team.  Then there are those who 
would be unemployed as a result of the owners actionsplayers, 
front office personnel, and stadium workers would all have valid 
claims that they had been injured.  Finally, cities like Washington, 
who have been courting MLB franchises for years, would have valid 
antitrust claims as well.  Adding salt to MLBs potential wounds, 
those with valid antitrust claims would be entitled to treble 
damages.196 
In addition to the numerous lawsuits, a loss of antitrust protection 
would also likely destroy the stability that the league has enjoyed for 
 
 192 See id. 
 193 See Bob Dart, Baseball Could Face Antitrust Squeeze Play, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 
18, 2001, at 5A (describing the difficult task faced by the bills sponsors). 
 194 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-37 (2001). 
 195 See id. 
 196 See id. 
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the last thirty years.  An MLB team has not moved since 1971, when 
the Washington Senators relocated to Texas and became the 
Rangers.197  If baseball lost its exemption and the Florida Marlins, 
frustrated by an inability to get a stadium approved, decided to pack 
up and move to Washington, D.C., there is little MLB could do.  
Legal precedent set by professional sports leagues subject to antitrust 
laws would weigh heavily against the league.198  For instance, in 
1982 Oakland Raiders owner Al Davis won an antitrust suit that 
allowed his team to move from Oakland to Los Angeles.199  Since 
that decision, seven other National Football League (hereinafter 
NFL) moves have taken place.200  A total of nine National 
Basketball Association (hereinafter NBA) and NHL teams have 
moved during that same period, and MLB franchise movement 
would likely cause this list to expand.201  Selig is well aware of this 
reality, noting recently that if you take the antitrust exemption 
away, people can move wherever they want to move.202 
If the antitrust exemption were to be lifted, it is very likely that 
New York City would once again become a three-team market.203  
Under current MLB rules, territorial exclusivity has been granted to 
one American League team and one National League team.204  
Without the benefit of its antitrust exemption, there is little reason to 
believe that such a rule would survive judicial scrutiny.  A third New 
 
 197 See Bob Gravely, Selig Defends Baseball Contraction Plan to Skeptical Lawmakers, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Dec. 6, 2001 (reporting that no team has relocated in thirty years). 
 198 See, e.g., L.A. Meml Coliseum Commn v. Natl Football League, 791 F.2d 1356 
(9th Cir. 1986) (finding that the NFLs attempts to prevent the Raiders from relocating from 
Oakland to Los Angeles amounted to an illegal restraint of trade); L.A. Meml Coliseum 
Commn v. Natl Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (sustaining the Raiders 
challenge to the NFLs rule requiring three-fourths of the leagues teams to approve one 
team moving into another teams territory, finding that the league was not a single entity 
and that it engaged in an illegal restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act). 
 199 See id. 
 200 See Gravely, supra note 197. 
 201 See id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 See Evan Weiner, New York Should Field Third Baseball Team, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), 
Dec. 6, 2001, at A51 (advocating that result). 
 204 See Andrew Zimbalist, Baseball and D.C., for All The Wrong Reasons, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 27, 2002, at B1 (noting that [b]aseballs rules grant teams territorial monopolies within 
a 75-mile radius, but only if the proposed nearby team would be in the same league.). 
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York team would benefit from a lucrative television package (MSG 
just lost the Yankees and no doubt is looking for summer 
programming), a massive corporate base, and millions of fans.205  
Considering the economic potential, it would seem to be more 
attractive to be the third most popular team in New York than the 
only team in small markets like Minneapolis and Kansas City.206  As 
an added bonus, a third New York team would likely cut into the 
overall revenues of both the Mets and Yankees, thereby bringing 
their overall revenues closer to the rest of the pack.207 
B. Collective Bargaining 
There is debate as to whether or not the owners plan to contract 
violates the Collective Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter CBA) 
that currently governs the relationship between the owners and 
players.208  Despite the fact that the agreement formally expired on 
November 7, 2001, labor law dictates that unless there is a strike, 
lockout, or a new deal is struck, the terms of an existing agreement 
continue to govern beyond the expiration date.209 
In early September, baseball owners sent the Players Association a 
letter stating they would seek to make changes in the sports CBA, 
which was agreed to in 1996.210  The letter was a formality under the 
National Labor Relations Act and was received on September 4 by 
the Players Association.211  Selig has claimed that he made it clear to 
 
 205 See Weiner, supra note 203. 
 206 See id. 
 207 See id. 
 208 See Dave Sheinin, Hearing on Contraction Begins Today, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2001, 
at D2 (reporting that the union contends that contraction must be bargained as part of a new 
collective bargaining agreement.). 
 209 See Contraction Grievance Heard; Labor Talks on Horizon, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 
4, 2002 (reporting that the expired labor contract . . . remains in force.), available at 
http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/2002/0104/1305847.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). 
 210 See Carrie Muskat, Players Have Questions Union Cant Yet                            
Answer, MLB.COM (Nov. 20, 2001) (describing the events factoring                                   
into the current controversy over contraction), at 
http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/mlb_news_story.jsp?article_id=mlb_2001112
0_playersunion_news&team_id=mlb (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). 
 211 See id. 
DAY.FINAL 2/15/02  2:57 PM 
548 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 12 
 
the union that contraction was a distinct possibility, an assertion the 
union denies.212  According to Donald Fehr, current union boss, the 
contraction announcement landed like a bombshell since it had not 
been discussed in any significant detail during earlier collective 
bargaining meetings.213 
Regardless of whether or not the union was actually on notice, 
Selig and the owners understood that choosing to implement 
contraction would require some union input.214  Management 
lawyers assured the Commissioner that although the owners had the 
right to unilaterally eliminate two franchises, specifics such as the 
dispersal of players would have to be subjects of bargaining with the 
union.215  Based on this assumption, the owners went ahead with 
their historic vote in early November.216 
Not surprisingly, immediately following the contraction 
announcement, the union countered with a grievance against the 
owners.217  The grievance, which currently is the subject of an 
arbitration hearing, charged that contraction violates at least nine 
provisions of the labor contract as well as four attachments to the 
contract, seven major league rules, all existing player contracts, and 
the clubs obligation of good faith and fair dealing under the 
CBA.218  In short, the union believes that since contraction affects 
major league players, it is subject to collective bargaining and cannot 
be unilaterally implemented by the owners.219  Rick Helling of the 
Texas Rangers, who also serves as the unions American League 
 
 212 See Selig Testimony, supra note 127. 
 213 See Ken Gurnick, Fehr, MLBPA Reps Weigh In, MLB.COM (Dec. 6, 2001) 
(describing the reactions of Fehr and union members to the contraction proposal), at 
http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/mlb_news_story.jsp?article_id=mlb_2001120
6_playersassociation_news&team_id=min (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). 
 214 See Larry Stone, Contraction Promises Rebirth of Bad Feelings, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Nov. 7, 2001, at D1. 
 215 See id. 
 216 See id. 
 217 See Murray Chass, The Union Puts up a Stop Sign as the Owners Plan Contraction, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001, at S3 (describing the unions initial reaction to the owners 
contraction plan). 
 218 See id. (detailing the contents of the unions grievance). 
 219 See Dave Sheinin, Union Challenges Contraction Bid, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2001, at 
D3 (reporting on the unions likely legal argument). 
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representative, claims that, From our position, contraction affects 
the players, and anything that affects the players has to be 
negotiated with the union.220 
While contraction is not specifically addressed in the CBA, Article 
II of the agreement states the Clubs recognize the association as the 
sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent for all major league 
players during the term of this agreement, with regard to all terms 
and conditions of employment.221  The union can reasonably argue 
that questions over contraction have significantly affected this years 
group of free agents.222  Hoping that perhaps they can obtain a 
superstar for free in some type of disbursement draft, teams are not 
willing to spend lavishly on the current crop of free agents.223  Since 
this impacts the future contract values of this years free agents, it 
could be argued that contraction has in fact had an impact on the 
terms and conditions of employment.224  History seems to be on 
the unions side, as during the 1990s three different arbitrators held 
that any issue affecting free agency had to be negotiated with the 
union and could not be enacted unilaterally by the owners.225 
Union founder Marvin Miller is among those who believes the 
owners have handled matters the wrong way.226  Theyre arguing 
 
 220 See id. 
 221 Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. II, quoted in Darren Rovell,                     
Legal Wrangling Begins over Contraction (Nov. 17, 2001), at 
http://espn.go.com/mlb/s/2001/1116/1279368.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). 
 222 See Peter Schmuck, Contraction Affects Free-Agent Signings, BALT.                            
SUN, Dec. 9, 2001 (describing the relative uncertainty facing free                                   
agents as contraction suddenly was made an option), available at 
http://www.amarillonet.com/stories/120901/spo_contraction.shtml (last visited Feb. 1, 
2002). 
 223 See id. (noting that the prospect of a dispersal draftwhich was supposed to take 
place in mid-Decembercreated the possibility that some teams would be able to acquire a 
marquee player without spending big free-agent money or giving up solid players in 
return.). 
 224 See Rovell, supra note 221 (containing the referenced language). 
 225 See Sheinin, supra note 208 (quoting William B. Gould IV, the former chairman of 
the National Labor Relations Board and former baseball arbitrator: [a]rbitrators have held 
in three different cases in the 1990s that any issue regarding free agency must be negotiated 
with the union and cannot be enacted unilaterally by the owners.). 
 226 See Jim Souhan, Miller: Selig Has Conflicts, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Nov. 14, 
2001, at 1C (detailing Millers argument that Selig should resign due to conflict of interest 
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that while they have to negotiate with the union on the impact on 
players otherwise they are free to do whatever they want, and dont 
have to negotiate contraction, Miller has stated.  I dont know how 
to separate the two.  How would you have contraction without 
having an impact on players?227  Donald Fehr agrees, having 
claimed, You cant do a deal just on contraction.  It affects too 
many other things.228 
However, the union may not have as strong a case as it believes.  
Although Selig has gone on record to state that subtracting clubs has 
nothing to do with the terms and conditions of employment, that is 
not his only argument.229  It is highly significant that the owners have 
yet to identify the teams to be eliminated.230  Based on this fact, if the 
union charged the owners with refusal to bargain, the owners could 
counter by stating, We havent done anything yet.231  Even this 
argument, however, has not convinced the owners that victory is 
guaranteed.232  Apparently, the owners chief labor lawyer warned 
them that there was a distinct possibility that contraction could 
backfire.233 
In the event that the union loses in arbitration, contraction is not 
necessarily imminent.  The Players Association might ask for support 
from the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter NLRB) in 
the event it can prove contraction would violate the Wagner Act of 
1935, which grants rights that enable unions to negotiate with 
management over working hours, wages, and working conditions.234  
 
appalled at their [the owners] methodstalking about this publicly, without having 
approached the union.). 
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POST, Oct. 26, 2001, at D1. 
 229 See Darren Rovell, Legal Wrangling Begins over Contraction, ESPN.COM (Nov. 17, 
2001), at http://espn.go.com/mlb/s/2001/1116/1279368.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). 
 230 See Souhan, supra note 226. 
 231 See id. 
 232 See Murray Chass, Delay Only Complicates Contraction, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, 
at S6 (describing the uncertainty of the fate of the contraction plan). 
 233 See id. 
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The NLRB has been sympathetic to the unions arguments in the 
past.235  However, that support came when the NLRBs general 
counsel was appointed by the Clinton administration.236  The current 
general counsel, Arthur F. Rosenfeld, was appointed by current 
President and former Texas Rangers owner George W. Bush, and is 
considered to be sympathetic to the owners side.237  Regardless, one 
former NLRB official claims, Whatever could happen before the 
NLRB, the matter would still have to be resolved between the 
parties.  All the legal maneuverings are just designed to get an upper 
hand in those negotiations.238 
C. Contractual Issues 
If in fact the Twins and Expos receive a death sentence from MLB, 
a chain reaction would occur leading to dozens of breach of contract 
claims.  This would add to contractions cost.  In order to buy out all 
the relevant contracts MLB would likely have to pay hundreds of 
millions of dollars in damages.  Here are just a few of the contract 
claims that the owners might face: 
• Major League Stadium LeasesOne potential contractual 
liability for the owners is the unexpired portion of the 
stadium leases of the teams that are being eliminated.  It 
has been speculated that this is one of the primary reasons 
that the Twins would be selected for contraction over a 
team like the Devil Rays, since Minnesotas lease, in 
theory, would be more attractive to buy out than Tampa 
Bays burdensome twenty-six year lease.239  Unfortunately 
for MLB, the reality is that any attempt to break the Twins 
 
of 1935, which ensures the right of the union to bargain with management regarding matters 
of working hours, wages, and working conditions). 
 235 See Dave Sheinin, supra note 219 (stating that the National Labor Relations Board 
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 236 See id. 
 237 See id. 
 238 See Rovell, supra note 229. 
 239 See Gary Shelton, Would it Make a Sound?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, at 
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DAY.FINAL 2/15/02  2:57 PM 
552 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 12 
 
lease with the Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission 
will come with its own share of headaches.240  On October 
1, the Twins signed an ongoing use agreement with the 
stadium commission, distinct from its lease, that requires 
them to actually play baseball at the Metrodome next 
year.241  A state court has ruled that the Minnesota Twins 
must be permitted to play out their contractual agreement 
with the local stadium authority, and, even if this specific 
performance remedy is overturned on appeal, baseball still 
is likely to have to pay damages to the stadium for breaking 
the lease.242 
• Spring Training LeasesThe Metrodome lease would not 
be the only one the Twins would break if eliminated.  The 
Team conducts Spring Training in Fort Myers, Florida, and 
currently has a lease with Lee County for the use of the Lee 
County Sports Complex.243  If contraction were to take 
place, the Twins would be forced to break their lease and, 
as a result, reimburse the county all scheduled payments 
of principal and interest due on bonds.244 
• Minor League Affiliate Stadium LeasesThe minor league 
 
 240 See Jay Weiner, Dome Panel Says It Will Enforce Twins 2002 Lease, MINNEAPOLIS 
STAR TRIB., Nov. 6, 2001 (stating that in response to talk of contraction, the Metropolitan 
Sports Facilities Commission told MLB that the Commission intends to exercise every 
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on-going use agreement with the stadium commission, which is distinct from their lease 
with the commission and requires the Twins to actually play baseball in the Metrodome next 
season and not simply buy out their lease). 
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MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Jan. 23, 2002 (reporting that the judge predicted a trial court may 
find an award of damages, estimated by owners at around $500,000, but that amount might 
not adequately compensate for non-monetary losses, and therefore might require specific 
performance instead), available at http://www.startribune.com/stories/509/1117044.html 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2002). 
 243 See Lee County Sports Complex (reporting that the lease term is twenty years), at 
http://www.angelfire.com/on/slammin/gftwins.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). 
 244 For details on this potential problem, see Kevin Kelly, FSL Sites Are Left in        
Lurch, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, available at 
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affiliates of contracted teams could also face lawsuits, and 
MLB would likely be on the hook for any resulting 
damages.  For example, the Ottawa Lynx are the Triple-A 
affiliate of the Expos.245  The Lynx currently have a lease 
with the City of Ottawa that allows the club to play its 
home games at JetFoam Park.246  Under the lease, the Lynx 
would face huge penalties if they folded within the next 
year and were forced to break the lease.247  Obviously, the 
elimination of the Expos certainly makes the subsequent 
elimination of the Lynx a possibility. 
• Other Stadium ContractsOther major and minor league 
stadium contracts could prove costly to buy out, as well.  
For example, all clubs have deals with concessionaires.  In 
addition, companies are tied up with stadium advertising 
deals, and corporations have leased luxury boxes for years. 
• Local Broadcast ContractsLocal broadcasters could also 
have a contract claim against the clubs.  As an example, 
Infinity-owned WCCO-AM has two years left on its 
contract with the Twins.248  Although sources indicate that 
Twins TV partner Fox Sports Net would not file a suit 
against baseball should the club be contracted, stranger 
things have happened.249 
• Player and Staff ContractsAnother potential liability is 
the unexpired portion of multi-year contracts for players 
who do not make another major league roster.  Folding two 
teams will eliminate fifty major league positions, and at 
least some of the players who will be dropped or demoted 
to the minor leagues will file a grievance if they do not 
make a major league roster, and the salary commitments in 
 
 245 For information on the Ottawa Lynx, a minor-league affiliate of the Montreal Expos, 
see http://www.canoe.ca/BaseballOTT/home.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2002). 
 246 See id. 
 247 See id. 
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STAR TRIB., Nov. 2, 2001, at 5C. 
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their existing contracts are not honored.250  Players are not 
the only employees of Major League Baseball clubs who 
might have contracts.  Front-office staff, vendors, and 
members of the groundskeeping crews are among the many 
others that could potentially lose their jobs due to 
contraction.  For all of his good points, Selig does, on 
occasion, have the tendency to put his foot in his mouth.  
On the day contraction was announced, a reporter asked the 
Commissioner if it was a sad day in the history of the 
game.251  Why is it a sad day? Selig replied with an 
incredulous look on his face.252  The Commissioner 
momentarily forgot that there is a human factor to 
contraction, and that some people would suddenly be 
jobless, and could require additional compensation from 
MLB. 
• Minor League Contraction FeesStill another potential 
liability could arise from folding twelve minor league 
franchises that have working agreements with the two 
teams that are eliminated.  This will not happen right away 
since the Professional Baseball Agreement, the deal 
between MLB and Minor League Baseball, states that 160 
minor league teams will be operated through 2003.253  
However, if contraction were to occur at the Major League 
level, eventually it would be necessary in the minors as 
well.254  At the moment, minor league baseball is booming, 
with Class AAA franchises commonly valued at $20 
 
 250 See Noll, supra note 150, at 5 (detailing another potential liability posed by 
contraction). 
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million or more, and even Class A franchises selling for 
several million.255  MLB could face the prospect of being 
forced to buy out twelve minor league teams at a total cost 
of over $50 to $75 million.256 
IV.  PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH CONTRACTION 
In addition to the numerous legal obstacles facing MLB, a close 
analysis of contraction reveals a number of non-legal, practical 
problems that hamper the proposal. 
A. Such a Drastic Move Is Not Necessary 
The decision to hand out death sentences to two clubs seems 
strange considering the overall health of Major League Baseball.  
Measured simply in terms of annual revenue, which is now soaring 
toward $4 billion, MLB is prospering.257  Fox and ESPN have 
flooded MLBs coffers with record-setting broadcast contracts.258  
Attendance has increased despite a near doubling in ticket prices 
since the strike.259  The Yankees-Diamondbacks World Series 
garnered incredible television ratings.260  Franchise values are 
soaring.261 
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Despite these encouraging developments, through its contraction 
proposal, MLB recently declared that baseball as we know it is on 
life-support.  In his recent testimony before the Committee on the 
Judiciary, Selig presented a number of alarming statistics based upon 
yet-to-be-audited financial figures.262  According to the 
Commissioner, baseballs total industry debt is over $3 billion, a 
figure that grows to nearly $8 billion when factoring in deferred 
compensation and future, guaranteed obligations to players.263  In the 
past seven years alone, the owners claim that cumulative operating 
losses have grown to nearly $1.4 billion.264  In 2001, Selig contends, 
only five clubs actually made money, and the consolidated loss for 
all thirty teams stood at approximately $519 million.265 
There is a great deal of skepticism about these figures.  The union 
contends that MLB refused to provide the House Judiciary 
Committee with all of the relevant financial material it had.266  Selig 
countered by testifying, We have given you all the financial 
information you need, to which Rep. Maxine Waters (D-Cal.) 
sharply retorted, Let me remind you, youre under oath, sir.267  
According to economist Andrew Zimbalist, [t]he bottom line can be 
juggled in a number of ways, all of which are legal.  But that doesnt 
tell you about the health of the game.268  The League claims that 
only two of baseballs thirty teams have made a cumulative profit 
since 1995.269  One of those teams, not surprisingly, is the 
Yankees.270  The other team, with a healthy profit of $39 million, is 
the Cleveland Indians.271  Interestingly, there is only one team over 
 
DISPATCH, Dec. 16, 2001, at D1 (questioning why so many offers were made to buy the Red 
Sox if Major League Baseballs business is in as much trouble as it claims). 
 262 See Selig Testimony, supra note 127. 
 263 See id. 
 264 See id. 
 265 See id. 
 266 See Mark Asher and William Gildea, Seligs Economic Recovery Pitch Elicits Few 
Takers, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2001, at D1 (stating that the union claimed that Selig refused 
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 267 See id. 
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Nov. 29, 2001, at 89. 
 269 See Sam Walker, Poor, Poor Baseball, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2001, at W8. 
 270 See id. 
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that same time span that was owned for a time by stockholders.272  
Because it was a publicly traded entity, that teams financial figures 
are not subject to the same doubt as Seligs figures.  Who was that 
team?  Thats right, the Cleveland Indians.273 
Take a moment and think of baseball like any other billion-dollar 
corporate entity.  If a company announced that it just finished the 
year $500 million in debt and would be forced to eliminate 7% of 
existing franchises, is it likely that the companys CEO would 
suddenly be rewarded with a three-year extension?274  It does not 
seem logical, and yet baseballs owners did precisely that by recently 
rewarding Selig with a new deal.275  This decision, when combined 
with other recent developments in the game, makes one wonder 
whether or not baseball truly is a dying industry.  On the day that 
Selig testified before Congress to state his case, Boston Red Sox 
officials were sorting through bids of approximately $400 million for 
a half-interest in the team.276  It is noteworthy that George Mitchell, 
the former Maine senator, is a part of one group looking to own the 
Red Sox.277  Just two years ago, Mitchell, along with other members 
of the Blue Ribbon Panel, spent over a year studying the games 
economics.278  If things are really so bad, then why would a brilliant, 
well-respected man who understands baseballs finances as well as 
anyone be so eager to enter the industry?  Another interesting 
development was the Yankees reported signing of free agent Jason 
 
million). 
 272 See id. (noting that Cleveland is the only team to be owned by stockholders during 
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 273 See id. 
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UNION-TRIB., Nov. 28, 2001, at D1 (reporting on Commissioner Seligs contract extension). 
 275 See Eric Fisher, Budgate Arrives at a Turbulent Time for Selig, Baseball, WASH. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at C3. 
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Standing, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 3, 2001, at 34 (reporting on the bidding process for the 
Boston franchise). 
 277 See id. (noting that Selig favors the Red Sox being sold to the group of Tom Werner, 
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Giambi to a seven-year, $120-million deal.279  Remarking on that 
deal, Minnesota Governor Jesse Ventura wondered, How, on one 
side of their mouths, can (the owners) plead poverty, and then on the 
other side . . . theyre paying these kinds of salaries?280  What 
should we expect next?  Will Enron, another struggling business 
giant, lavishly pay for naming rights at another ballpark despite its 
impending bankruptcy?  Of course not, because Enron actually is 
financially doomed.  Major League Baseball, on the other hand, is 
not. 
B. A Solution Motivated by Greed? 
Although the specifics of contraction remain unclear, one thing is 
certainthe surviving owners will profit if in fact two teams are 
eliminated.  Based on this reality, it is likely that the rich teams 
simply voted to erase their smallest partners, thereby leaving more 
cash for them to divide.  Every surviving owner would receive a 
greater share of MLBs Central Fund, which is distributed evenly to 
all the teams.  In 2001, every team (with the exception of recent 
expansion franchises Arizona and Tampa Bay) received 
approximately $24 million from the Central Fund.281  If two teams 
were to be eliminated, the remaining twenty-eight teams would 
evenly split the $48 million that would have been distributed to the 
eliminated teams.282  Therefore, surviving owners would get 
approximately $1.7 million in additional Central Fund money per 
year.283  Owners of wealthy teams would also benefit due to a 
reduction in revenue sharing payments.  The Twins and Expos 
received a combined $47.586 million last season in revenue sharing, 
a commitment that would disappear along with the teams.284  Finally, 
the elimination of two teams would lead to lucrative expansion fees 
in the future for the surviving owners.  In the unlikely event that 
 
 279 See Feinsand, supra note 93. 
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contraction is implemented and helps fix baseballs economic 
problems, there is a good possibility that the league could re-expand 
to thirty teams.  If that were the case, owners would profit 
handsomely.  During the past expansion three years ago, the Tampa 
Bay Devil Rays and Arizona Diamondbacks paid $130 million each, 
which resulted in a healthy profit of nearly $10 million for each 
existing owner.285  If expansion becomes an option in the future, 
there is no doubt that this price tag will go up. 
C. An Arbitrary Proposal that Does Not Address Baseballs Real 
Problems 
Although the extent of baseballs financial misery is in dispute, 
there is no doubt that modern day baseball does have problems.  As 
noted above, baseballs primary problem is a lack of competitive 
balance, a situation exacerbated by disparity in local revenues.  Sure, 
if contraction were to proceed, then two franchises with little hope of 
ever reaching the World Series would be eliminated.  However, 
many clubs condemned to perpetual mediocrity would remain in 
existence.  By killing off two of the leagues weaker teams, baseball 
would not be addressing the issue of competitive imbalance.  
According to one analyst, contraction is like having a disease on 
your arm and then cutting your arm off without finding out whats 
wrong.  The disease can then spread to the rest of your body if you 
dont diagnose it correctly.286  Selig and the rest of the owners have 
done nothing to show that contraction is the cure for what currently 
ails the game.287  The teams to be eliminated, the cost of buying out 
franchises, and the effect on the schedule and possible realignment 
have not been addressed.288  No credible studies have been presented 
that show there is no hope in the future for the Twins and Expos.289   
 
 285 See Richard Sandomir, Decades of Growth Coming to an End, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 
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Furthermore, there is no convincing argument that relocation is not a 
better option than contraction.290 
People have always been predicting the hopelessness of certain 
teams, but never before were there calls for franchise euthanasia.  If 
contraction had been a proposed solution back in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, the Seattle Mariners probably would not have been 
around to tie a Major League record this year with 116 wins.291  In 
addition, such a proposal during that same era surely would have 
targeted the Atlanta Braves, who last season won their tenth straight 
division title.292  The Cleveland Indians are another compelling 
example. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Indians were a dying 
franchise playing in a decaying stadium.293  After the Tribe lost 105 
games in 1991, Bill James claimed, [t]he Cleveland Indians have 
become the first team to abandon the hope of paying a competitive 
salary to a quality player.294  At the time, the Indians value was 
estimated at $77 million, the second lowest in baseball.295  Today, 
the Indians have dominated their division in recent years and are 
valued at $372 million, making them one of baseballs five most 
valuable franchises.296 
 
 290 See id. 
 291 See generally The Official Site of the Seattle Mariners, History (reviewing the history 
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The parallel between the Indians and Twins is eerie.  The Twins 
compete in the thirteenth-largest television market in the country, 
while Cleveland is ranked fifteenth.297  The Twins recent attendance 
patternbetween 1.05 and 1.4 million between 1994 and 2000
mirrors that of the Indians during the pre-Jacobs Field days.298  Last 
year, with a competitive team, the Twins drew 1.78 million fans, a 
70% increase from the previous years attendance.299  Likewise, in 
1993, when the Indians were finally showing signs of life and Jacobs 
Field was one year away, the Tribe drew 2.17 million, a 78% 
increase from the year before.300  The Indians were spared from 
contraction and have become one of MLBs model franchiseswhy 
shouldnt the Twins be given the same right? 
Because the owners have yet to show just how eliminating two 
franchises will help the game, it seems completely illogical to kill 
teams off just for the sake of taking some action.  Neither the Expos 
nor the Twins deserve to be eliminated, although the thought of 
killing a franchise is even more repulsive in Minnesotas case.  The 
Twins are an organization that has been around for 100 years, dating 
back to the days of the Washington Senators.301  Walter Johnson, 
considered by many to be the greatest pitcher in history, spent his 
entire career with the franchise.302  The Twins were the first Major 
League club ever to draw over three million fans in a season, and just 
ten years ago they were celebrating a World Championship.303  Last 
season, in what some baseball officials hope was their swan song, the 
Club led their division for the majority of the season and drew 1.8 
million fans with the lowest budget in baseball.304  Any plan to wipe 
 
 297 See Richard Sandomir, Developing a Winning Team Should Be Preferred to Closing 
the Books, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2001, at S3. 
 298 See id. 
 299 See id. 
 300 See id. 
 301 See Paul Sullivan, Fans, Cities in Limbo, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 8, 2001, at N1. 
 302 See Bob Ryan, The First Name in Fireballing: Any Discussion of Heat Starts with 
Walter Johnson, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31, 2000, at E7 (discussing the career of the 
legendary hurler). 
 303 See Jim Souhan, The Twins Were a Major League Baseball Role Model a Decade 
Ago, But Now Theyre a Contraction Probability. What happened?, MINNEAPOLIS STAR 
TRIB., Dec. 16, 2001, at 1C (describing the peak of the Minnesota franchise). 
 304 See Kirk Bohls, Cutting Twins Doesnt Make Sense, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Nov. 
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out a franchise like the Twins, especially a plan that ultimately would 
not achieve anything, is completely unjustifiable. 
D. The Owners Are Not Serious about Contraction 
It is clear that there are many impediments to the implementation 
of contraction, and the nature of these obstacles leads one to believe 
that contraction will never happen.  Therefore, the obvious question 
arises: What were the owners thinking?  One guess is that the owners 
never seriously thought they could pull off this plan and were simply 
looking for leverage over two important groups.  The vote for 
contraction was as much an attempt to gain leverage with different 
cities and state governments, as it was an attempt to gain the upper 
hand in negotiations with the Players Association.  Marvin Miller, 
the man responsible for the formation of the union, believes that he 
sees right through the owners proposal: On the one hand, they 
seem to want to hammer the union with the loss of jobs and on the 
other hand, they seem to want to hammer the various 
communities. . . .  This is a double-headed ploy.305 
It is very likely that the owners see contraction simply as a 
bargaining chip for the upcoming labor negotiations with the union.  
Selig refutes this notion, having gone on record to state that 
contraction is not something we have done to create leverage or 
threaten the players.306  However, the Players Association remains 
unconvinced.307  Twins Player Representative Denny Hocking stated, 
We dont know if theyre trying to say, OK, we want to eliminate 
two teams or if theyre going to use that in the basic agreement 
negotiations against us for a salary cap.308  Whether the intent is 
there or not, the threat of taking away major league jobs does indeed 
seem to impact labor negotiations. 
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The threat of contraction also could be an effort to exert pressure 
on communities so that they will give in and finance new stadiums.  
Montreal, Minnesota, and Florida are the three teams most frequently 
mentioned when contraction talk arises.  Not coincidentally, all three 
of those teams have seen their local community vote down a stadium 
proposal in recent years.309  The threat of contraction essentially 
places a gun to the head of these cities and others in the future
build a new stadium, or else.  According to Miller, What lends 
credibility to this theory is they havent named the teams that are 
supposed to fold.  That would have limited their leverage to two 
cities.310 
V.  REAL SOLUTIONS 
Contraction has already been extremely costly.  With all the 
attention it has garnered, the proposal has distracted baseballs 
leaders from what the game really needs at the moment: a CBA that 
will help alleviate the games current competitive balance problems.  
Contraction is the ultimate red herring, a non-issue that has drained 
the time and energy of the games primary decision-makers.  Real 
solutions need to be looked at and addressed so that yet another work 
stoppage can be avoided.  It is worth emphasizing that compromise is 
needed from three key groups, not two.311  As David Cone astutely 
pointed out, [t]he general perception is that its billionaire owners 
versus millionaire players, but actually its a three-headed battle.  
The big-revenue owners are fighting the small-revenue owners and 
the players are the third party.312  These parties need to place the 
health of the game ahead of their own agendas for once and be 
willing to make sacrifices. 
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What follows is a series of solutions that would at least put 
baseball back on the right track.  Those intimately familiar with these 
issues will notice that my proposal in some respects mirrors those 
issued by Bob Costas and the Blue Ribbon Panel.313  Although I do 
not agree with all of their proposals (for example, see Costass 
Floor-to-Ceiling Salary Cap and the Panels Competitive Balance 
Draft), I highly respect their grasp of the big picture.314  In 
developing their recommendations, Costas and the Panel benefited 
from a perspective unavailable to the owners or unionthey were 
truly acting on behalf of the game of baseball and its fans.  Bud Selig 
and Donald Fehr do not have this perspective, and that is 
understandable.  After all, their jobs are to be the best advocates 
possible for their clients and they perform that duty admirably.  
However, sometimes it takes those without passionate client loyalty 
to actually resolve a conflict.  In essence, Costas, the Panel, and I are 
attempting to play the role of mediator between the owners and 
union when creating these types of proposals. 
By including the following proposals into a new CBA, competitive 
balance would once again have a chance, along with hope and faith 
in baseball fans throughout North America.  It is worth remembering 
that under the recently expired CBA, three-quarters of team owners 
would have to agree to the recommendations and the union would 
have to sign off as well.315  Therefore, this is not necessarily the best 
solution for baseballone need only look at the NFL current 
agreement to see the best way to achieve complete competitive 
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balance.316  Instead, the recommendations below are realistic 
solutions that would improve competition in baseball and could 
potentially be agreed upon by the relevant leaders of the sport. 
A. Equitable Distribution of Local Revenue 
The greatest emphasis should be placed on expanded sharing of 
local revenues, and fortunately all parties seem to understand the 
issues importance.  During his recent House testimony, Selig stated 
that the owners will persist in attempting to achieve greater local 
revenue sharing in our upcoming negotiations with the union.317  
Similarly, Fehr has gone on record as believing that when we get 
into the heavy bargaining, the most likely result is that the principal 
issue will be revenue sharing.318 
MLBs old revenue sharing plan simply did not work, as it 
produced neither the intended moderation of payroll disparities, nor 
improved competitive balance.  Some low-revenue clubs, 
determining that their revenue sharing payments were not enough to 
make them competitive, used those proceeds to become modestly 
profitable.319  Given that at least the bottom half of teams recognize 
that they have no hope of competing in the free agent market, their 
best profit-maximizing strategy was to lowball their payroll, perform 
poorly and collect large transfers from the rich teams.320  Therefore, 
it comes as no surprise that under the old system the bottom half of 
teams got worse as the top teams pulled in millions of additional 
dollars from lucrative local revenue streams.321 
Additionally, an entire middle class of teams emerged that were 
shut out of the limited economic assistance provided by the revenue 
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sharing and remained just as non-competitive, both on the field and 
on the ledger sheet, as the low revenue clubs.322  The only teams 
making money are at the top end and at the bottom end, MLB 
Executive Sandy Alderson once commented.323  The other clubs 
will figure it out.  And what that means is that a team that spends $30 
million looks around and says, Hey, I can finish in fourth place 
spending $10 million just as easily as $30 million.  So they cut 
payroll.324  While the Braves, Yankees, Dodgers, and Mets raced to 
determine who would have the first $100 million-plus payroll, the 
Expos, Twins and others have headed in the other direction, slashing 
payroll in an effort to break even.325 
Looking forward, the plan that would make the most sense would 
be an equitable split of local revenue in which every other dollar of 
gate receipts and local broadcast fees would be shared.  In order to 
make this Equitable System palatable to high-revenue owners, 
such a proposal should be introduced incrementally.  For instance, let 
us say the owners and the union agree on a new six-year CBA.  The 
ultimate goal would be to have a complete 50-50 home team-visiting 
team split by the agreements last year so that both sides could assess 
the success of the plan when negotiations on a new agreement begin.  
Therefore, start with a 75-25 split in 2002, move to 70-30 in 2003, 
65-35 in 2004, and so on until there is an even split by 2007. 
What should be shared?  First of all, regular-season gate receipts 
should be equitably divided.  Under the existing system home teams 
keep 100% of regular season game receipts.326  This unequal 
distribution ignores the fact that without a visiting team to compete 
against, no fans would show up to watch their local club.  Therefore, 
it only seems natural to split the regular-season gate receipts 
equitably among all teams.  How would this work?  Well, in 2001 
Major League clubs made nearly $1.4 billion in regular season gate 
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receipts.327  At the high end, the Yankees pulled in $98 million from 
their home games, while the lowly Expos could only manage $6.4 
million.328  Now, I certainly am not suggesting that the $1.4 billion 
should be divided equallythis would not be fair to the Yankees and 
would unjustly reward the Expos.  Under my proposal, teams would 
keep 50% of their regular season gate receipts and contribute the 
other half to an equitable game receipt pool.  The funds in this pool 
would then be distributed evenly among the thirty teams.  For 
instance, in 2001 each club would have kept half of their home 
receipts and would also receive approximately $23 million from the 
equitable game receipt pool.329  Thus, the Yankees would walk away 
with over $72 million and the Expos would benefit with over $26 
million.330 While the Yankees would still be rewarded for their great 
attendance, clubs like the Expos would finally benefit from the 
notion that one clubs gate receipts would not be possible without a 
visiting team. 
In addition, local broadcast deals should be equitably divided 
among the leagues teams by using the same principle.  With the 
advent of cable television, the disparity in local broadcast fees has 
grown incredibly.331  The only way to address this inequity is to split 
the fees in the same manner proposed above.  Again, this would 
remain consistent with the idea that the clubs are business partners 
who cannot survive without each other.  After all, how much would 
the Yankees receive for broadcasting rights if no other teams existed 
and New York media outlets were forced to cover intra-squad 
scrimmages?  Lets look at the Yankees and Expos again to 
demonstrate how this would work.  In 2001, the Yankees received 
$56.75 million from their broadcast deals while the Expos could 
manage only $536,000.332  Under this Equitable System, half of each 
teams local broadcast revenue would be pooled in an equitable 
local broadcast fund the Yankees would contribute approximately 
$28 million and keep $28 million from their deal.  Since MLB clubs 
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earned a total of $571 million this year from their local broadcast 
deals, half of that total would be divided up equally and redistributed 
to every team.333  Thus, the Yankees and Expos, like the remaining 
twenty-eight teams, would each receive approximately $9.5 million 
from the equitable local broadcast pool.334  When adding this to the 
half-share of the local deal that each team could hold on to, the new 
figures would be $37.5 million in local broadcast revenue for the 
Yankees and $10 million for the Expos.335  While this still gives the 
Yankees a significant advantage, such a proposal would significantly 
close the gap between teams in lucrative media markets and those in 
smaller markets where local broadcast rights will never command a 
high fee. 
In order for this plan to work, independent audits must be made to 
ensure that each club contributes half of the market value of their 
local broadcast package as opposed to the actual contract value.  
Taking a look at some of the current broadcast rights deals 
emphasizes the need for this.336  The Dodgers received $27.342 
million for local broadcast rights, which seems low compared to the 
other large-market clubs such as the Mets ($46.251 million) and 
Yankees ($56.750 million).337  How could broadcast rights in the 
nations second largest market be so inexpensive?  Well, the Dodgers 
are owned by Fox and are not charging the parent company what 
they might charge an independent one.338  The Cubs ($23.559 
million), owned by the Tribune Company (which owns and operates 
WGN), and the Braves ($19.988 million), owned by AOL/Time 
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Warner/Ted Turner (which owns and operates WTBS) are in similar 
situations.339  By looking at the market value of each teams deal, the 
equitable local broadcast pool would increase, thereby allowing 
small-market teams to receive larger pool payments. 
As a concession to the high-revenue owners, one thing that should 
not be equitably distributed is what MLB calls, All Other Local 
Operating Revenue.340  This figure includes revenue obtained from 
sources such as suite sales, stadium signage, sponsorship deals, and 
concessions.341  Thus, the Equitable System simply divides regular 
season gate receipts and local broadcasting revenue in a fair way that 
ensures overall local-revenue disparity will not reach obscene levels. 
Let us take a look at how this Equitable System of local revenue 
sharing would have affected the Yankees and Expos overall 
revenue figures (in millions) in 2001:342 
 
Under Current System                             Yankees                   Expos 
Regular System Game Receipts                $98                          $6.405 
Local Television, Radio and Cable           $56.75                     $.536 
All Other Local Operating Revenue         $47.057                    $2.829 
Total Local Revenue                                $201.807                $9.770 
 
 
 339 See id. 
 340 See 2001 Forecast, supra note 49; see also Jim Banks, Is Money Everything?, 
MLB.COM (Dec. 6, 2001) (describing the other sources of local revenue for                        
the wealthier teams, including suite sales, stadium signage, sponsorship                          
deals and concessions, benefits of having new stadiums all of which are incorporated          
in other local operating revenue in MLBs spreadsheet), at 
http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/mlb_news_story.jsp?article_id=mlb_2001120
6_banks_news&team_id=mlb (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). 
 341 See id. 
 342 See 2001 Forecast, supra note 49. 
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Under Equitable System                                 Yankees        Expos 
50% of Regular System Game Receipts         $49                $3.2025 
Share of Equitable Game Receipt Pool       $23.075         $23.075 
50% of Local Television, Radio and Cable    $28.375         $.268 
Share of Equitable Local Broadcast Pool    $9.518          $9.518 
All Other Operating Revenue                          $47.057        $2.829 
Total Local Revenue                                      $157.025      $38.893 
The new system cuts the Yankees local revenue advantage from 
over 10:1 to just over 4:1.  What about Montreals supposed 
contraction partners, the Twins?  It seems to be a foregone 
conclusion that the Expos will never survive in Montreal.  Twins 
supporters, however, believe that the club can survive in the Land of 
10,000 Lakes.  Let us take a look at how the Equitable System would 
have affected the local revenue gap between the Yankees and Twins 
(in millions):343 
 
Under Current System                                      Yankees       Twins 
Regular System Game Receipts                        $98              $17.605 
Local Television, Radio and Cable                   $56.75         $7.273 
All Other Local Operating Revenue                  $47.057       $6.987 
Total Local Revenue                                       $201.807      $31.865 
 
 
 343 See id. 
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Under Equitable System                                    Yankees          Twins 
50% of Regular System Game Receipts            $49                $8.8025 
Share of Equitable Game Receipt Pool          $23.075         $23.075 
50% of Local Television, Radio and Cable       $28.375         $3.6365 
Share of Equitable Local Broadcast Pool       $9.518            $9.518 
All Other Operating Revenue                            $47.057         $6.987 
Total Local Revenue                                        $157.025       $52.019 
Again, the Yankees enjoy an advantage under both systems, but 
under the Equitable System the ratio falls from approximately 6.5:1 
to approximately 3.1:1.  By further factoring in luxury tax 
adjustments and increased Central Fund payments (see below), it 
seems clear that under the Equitable System small market teams like 
the Twins could at least be in the same neighborhood as the Yankees 
when it comes to overall revenues. 
B. Luxury Tax, Not a Salary Cap 
During the past few seasons several baseball owners claimed that 
they would seek massive changes during the next round of labor 
talks.344  Many emphasized the need for a salary cap, saying it is the 
only way small market teams would be able to survive against the 
big spenders.345  Although there is certainly truth in that assessment, 
the likelihood of the union agreeing to a NFL- or NBA-style salary 
cap is zero.  According to Kevin Towers, the General Manager of the 
San Diego Padres, [a] payroll cap would be terrific, but the unions 
never going to allow that.346  Fehr would concur wholeheartedly 
with Towers assessment.347  The purpose of a cap is to pay players 
 
 344 See Jeffrey Flanagan, Baseballs Small Market Teams Might Fare Better on Their 
Own, KAN. CITY STAR, Jan. 26, 1999, at C2. 
 345 See id. 
 346 Steve Rock, Small Revenue Clubs Hope System Changes, KAN. CITY STAR, Apr. 4, 
1999, at J2. 
 347 See Ronald Blum, Fehr Says Forget about Salary Cap, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 21, 
1999. 
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less than their free-market value, he has said.  Its hard to envision 
this union doing that to its own members.348  Following the NBA 
agreement, Fehr had a clear response for baseball owners dreaming 
of an NBA-style salary cap: forget it.349  Along with other top union 
officials, Fehr believes the NBA union handed over the free market 
in a shocking capitulation and is convinced that baseball players 
must be prepared to withstand a long lockout rather than make that 
same sacrifice by accepting a cap.350 
A better alternative for both sides would be the implementation of 
a luxury tax.  Under the previous CBA there was a luxury tax from 
1997 to 1999.351  Although the union opposes this proposal due to 
the fact that it is cap-like, it is worth noting that in the three 
seasons in which the luxury tax was in effect the tax had no 
discernible impact on the growth of player salaries.352  If the union 
remains skeptical of a luxury tax, the owners should make 
concessions so that it can gain acceptance and help regulate 
baseballs economic system.  Two possible points to give in on 
would be an increase in the minimum player salary from $200,000 to 
$300,000 and increased benefits for former players.  A luxury tax is 
crucial to the health of the game and would be well worth those 
concessions. 
Under my proposal, a tax would be placed on every dollar that a 
team spends above an established payroll threshold.  The payroll 
threshold would start at $90 million and increase each year at the 
same rate as baseballs total operating revenue.  The tax would start 
at 50% for every dollar spent above $90 million and would increase 
10% for each additional $5 million payroll increment.  For example, 
a club with a payroll of $100 million would pay a 50% tax on their 
first $5 million over the threshold, then would have to pay a 60% tax 
for every dollar spent in the next $5 million increment. 
 
 348 See id. 
 349 See id. 
 350 See Ross Newhan, Beware of Lockout: Owners Envy NBA Cap, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 
1999, at D10 (describing union philosophy as expressed by Marvin Miller that in agreeing 
to a salary ceiling the NBA union improperly forewent their free agent market and advising 
that MLB players be willing to sustain a long lockout rather than accept a salary cap). 
 351 See Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 8, 38. 
 352 Selig Testimony, supra note 127. 
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To demonstrate this proposal, suppose this type of luxury tax had 
been implemented in 2001.  The tax chart would look like this: 
Payroll Figure                          Tax % Paid Per Dollar Spent in Range 
$90-95 million                          50% 
$95-100 million                        60% 
$100-105 million                      70% 
$105-110 million                      80% 
$110-115 million                      90% 
$115 million and above          100% 
Eight clubs had player compensation and benefit expenses of over 
$90 million in 2001, with the Boston Red Sox leading the way at 
over $118 million.353  Based on the luxury-tax formula set out above, 
those breaking the applicable threshold would have had to pay the 
following taxes:354 
Team        01 Payroll (in Millions)   Luxury Tax Figure (in Millions) 
Arizona           $99.434                            $5.16 
Atlanta            $99.671                            $5.303 
Boston            $118.471                           $23.471 
Cleveland       $102.491                           $7.244 
L.A.                $116.077                           $21.077 
NY Mets        $99.144                              $4.986 
NY Yankees  $117.936                            $22.936 
Texas             $92.793                              $1.397 
Total Luxury Tax Payments:    $91.574 
 
 353 See 2001 Forecast, supra note 49. 
 354 See id. 
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The tax that each team over the threshold pays would be placed in 
an equitable luxury tax pool and redistributed equally to all non-
infringing clubs.  Since twenty-two clubs remained under $90 
million in team payroll in 2001, the $91.574 million placed into the 
equitable luxury tax pool would be divided by twenty-two, and the 
entitled teams would each receive a $4.162 million share.355 
Under this type of luxury-tax plan, Seattle, which was only $6.054 
million below the threshold in 2001, would receive the same amount 
as the Twins, owners of the games lowest payroll.356  This remains 
consistent with the equitable principles preached above in regards to 
local-revenue sharing.  A sliding-scale payment distribution that 
rewards teams at the bottom of the payroll chart with more money 
would be illogical, since this would provide clubs with an incentive 
to slash payroll.357  By giving every eligible team the exact same 
share of local revenue and luxury-tax payments, baseball would 
avoid a repeat of the welfare state created under past proposals. 
C. Institute Minimum Team Payroll 
The only way that high revenue clubs would be willing to consider 
the Equitable System of local-revenue sharing and the luxury tax 
proposed above would be if a minimum team payroll is 
implemented.  Under those proposals, owners like George 
Steinbrenner and Tom Hicks would be sacrificing millions of dollars 
for the sake of the games integrity.  However, that integrity could 
easily be robbed by owners like Carl Pohlad who, under the old 
system, pocketed large revenue sharing sums, yet refused to reinvest 
that money into team payroll.358  In 2001, the Twins benefited from 
over $19 million in revenue sharing receipts.359  Despite this 
 
 355 See id. 
 356 See id. 
 357 The Blue Ribbon Report referred to sliding scale payment distribution as a split pool 
plan.  See Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 38. 
 358 See Chris Jenkins, A Twin Killing; Seligs Contraction a Shot Across Bow to Games 
Have-Nots, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 7, 2001, at D1 (explaining the teams ability to 
make a profit in the previous three years in large part due to the fact that owners like Carl 
Pohlad and Jeffrey Loria refused to put added money towards the payroll). 
 359 See 2001 Forecast, supra note 49. 
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windfall, Pohlad would only allow the club to spend $30 million in 
payrolls and benefits.360  Although the Twins had a surprise season 
on the field, no one can honestly claim that the team was built to 
compete with the Yankeesit was built so that the franchise could 
turn a profit.  A minimum payroll would ensure that team 
compensation decisions relate more to wins and losses than an ability 
to end the season in the black. 
How would it work?  Well, it would not be a strict minimum, as 
teams would be allowed to have a payroll below the minimum 
threshold.  As has been shown above, a high payroll corresponds 
directly with a teams on field success.361  Therefore, in an effort to 
make all clubs do their best to remain competitive, substantial 
penalties would have to exist for clubs that fall below the minimum 
threshold.  The best solution would be to withhold local-revenue 
sharing and luxury-tax payments from any team that fails to meet the 
payroll minimum.  That money could then be redistributed equally to 
those teams that did meet the minimum and are actually making an 
effort to compete. 
D. Allow and Encourage Franchise Relocation 
In place of contraction, franchise relocation should be encouraged 
to address the competitive issues facing the game.  Clubs that have 
little likelihood of securing a new ballpark or undertaking other 
revenue-enhancing activities should have the option to relocate if 
better markets can be identified.  The relocation of a club to a more 
attractive market would present the club with an opportunity to 
generate more revenue that, in turn, reasonably could be expected to 
make the club more financially capable of competing with high 
revenue clubs in terms of on-field performance. 
Following this logic, the first thing MLB should do is keep the 
Expos in business and allow them to relocate to the Washington, 
D.C. area, the nations seventh largest metropolitan area and the 
 
 360 See id. 
 361 See Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 29. 
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wealthiest in per capita income.362  It is clear that baseball will no 
longer prosper in Montreal.  As one writer put it, [b]aseball is dead 
in that city and has no chance of being revived.  More people show 
up for garage sales.363  Demographic studies have shown that the 
Washington area is by far the largest and wealthiest U.S. city without 
a major league team and much better positioned economically to 
support a franchise than Seligs hometown of Milwaukee.364  The 
Virginia Baseball Stadium Authority has already drawn up plans for 
a national landmark ballpark to be built near the Pentagon at a cost 
of approximately $325 million, and independent studies estimate a 
local team could easily draw in excess of 35,000 fans a game.365  The 
financial benefits to current owners would be great.  As a result of 
relocation, they would save approximately $250 million in franchise 
buyout fees.366  In addition, national television ratings would 
increase with the introduction of a new major market, thereby 
increasing the price tag for future broadcast rights.  Finally, licensed 
merchandise would undoubtedly see a bump in sales. 
Whenever the Washington market is mentioned as a possible 
franchise destination, inevitably the concerns of Peter Angelos and 
the Baltimore Orioles emerge.  Angelos has stated that baseball in 
 
 362 See Eric Fisher, Despite Loss of Teams, D.C. Not in 02 Lineup, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 
8, 2001, at A1 (proposing the relocation to the D.C. area of one of the economically 
suffering teams as an alternative to contraction, noting that the area is a fertile market as the 
countrys seventh largest metropolitan area with the wealthiest per-capita income and yet 
has not fielded a team for over thirty years). 
 363 See Tom Haudricourt, Contraction Scenarios Likely Too Late to Affect 2002, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENT., Oct. 28, 2001 (describing the different factors involved in the plans 
for contraction and noting the complete necessity of removing the team from Montreal). 
 364 See Eric Fisher, Area Groups Might Sue if Baseball Folds Teams, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 
24, 2001, at C1 (noting demographic studies which have demonstrated that the Washington 
D.C. area is the largest and wealthiest city without a team and concluding that the area 
would be able to draw an excess of 35,000 fans per game). 
 365 See id.; see also Mark Asher, New Stadium in Virginia Proposed, WASH. POST, Oct. 
27, 2001, at D4 (describing the Virginia Baseball Stadium Authoritys proposal to build a 
$325-million stadium located near the Pentagon and Reagan National Airport as a national 
landmark honoring the lives of members of the armed forces lost in the events of September 
11th). 
 366 Most media estimates place the price tag for buying out the Twins or Expos at $250 
million.  See, e.g., Richard Justice, No Easy Answers; Owners Contraction Plan Means 
Questions, Controversy, Legal Issues, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 8, 2001, at 1 (indicating 
departing owners would receive between $200 and $250 million). 
DAY.FINAL 2/15/02  2:57 PM 
2002] CONTRACTION & MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 577 
 
D.C. would be disastrous for both the new franchise and the Orioles 
since two ballclubs within 30 miles of each other are simply going 
to grind each other into serious financial problems.367  It should be 
emphasized that Angelos arguments and bargaining strength have 
been overplayed in the press, and he should not be seen as an 
impediment to moving a club to Washington.  Baltimore and 
Washington are considered two different markets by most 
demographic studies, and the distance between markets is greater 
than the thirty miles Angelos makes reference to.368  In addition, 
although under Major League Rules Angelos does have the right to 
veto the relocation of an American League team to any area within a 
seventy-five-mile radius of Baltimore, he has no legal right to stop 
the move of a National League team.369  Nevertheless, baseball 
would be wise to use some of the money they save in contraction 
fees to grease the skids into Washington by compensating the ever-
litigious Angelos in some manner. 
E. Fix the Draft 
The First Year Player Draft was originally designed to reward 
unsuccessful teams by giving them the first shot at the top 
amateurs.370  In theory, allowing disappointing teams the first chance 
to sign baseballs future superstars should eventually turn their 
fortunes around.371  Unfortunately, today, the draft has the exact 
opposite effect, as high-revenue clubs now use the current format to 
help cement their place among baseballs hierarchy.372  If the 
 
 367 See Mark Asher, Angelos Protects His Turf, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2001, at D1 
(expressing Peter Angelos view that relocating a team to the D.C. area would be 
detrimental to the leagues purpose and that two ball clubs within a thirty-mile radius would 
be financially burdensome to both teams). 
 368 See id. (noting that the distance between Washington and Baltimore is greater than 
the portrayed thirty-mile distance and that most demographic studies consider the two cities 
to be two separate markets). 
 369 See id. (stating that although Angelos maintains veto power over the relocation of an 
American League team, he has no legal right to stop a National League team from such an 
action). 
 370 See Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 41. 
 371 See id. 
 372 See id. 
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following changes were made to the First Year Player Draft, it would 
once again serve its purpose of reversing fortunes of downtrodden 
teams: 
• Institute a Worldwide DraftMaking every amateur player 
eligible for the draft would give each team the same chance 
at the best players.  Without such a modification, top 
international players will continue to fall to the top five or 
six revenue producers in the league, since they will be the 
only clubs with the ability to realistically enter the bidding. 
• Place a Cap on First Year Player Signing BonusesThere 
are too many situations where teams at the top of the draft, 
convinced that they do not have the money to sign the 
player they want, take an inferior player just to sign 
someone.373  As a result, the top players fall to the high 
revenue teams who usually sign them for the money they 
are seeking.374  In many cases, by speaking with clubs 
before the draft and discussing bonus demands, agents can 
virtually hand pick which club a heavily sought-after client 
will be drafted by.375  Placing a cap on signing bonuses 
would help alleviate this situation. 
• Allow Teams to Trade Their Draft PicksBaseball teams 
are forbidden from trading draft picks, a situation that does 
not exist in any of the three other major sports.376  General 
Managers like Kevin Towers of the Padres feel that by 
allowing teams to trade their draft picks, some of the draft 
disadvantages would be alleviated: [s]ay you finished last 
and you wanted to trade that pick to  the  Yankees  for their  
 
 373 See Blackman, supra note 27 (using as an example the draft decisions surrounding 
J.D. Drew who although the obvious choice for the As number two draft pick was passed 
over for Mark Mulder after the As were unable to meet Drews salary demands). 
 374 See id. (describing the current bidding situation where it is essentially only the 
wealthy teams who are able to compete for the top players as they are the only ones capable 
of entering the bidding). 
 375 See id. 
 376 See id. 
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first-round pick and second-round pick.  At least that gives        
you some flexibility.  It gives you another option.377 
• Eliminate Compensation PicksUnder the current system, 
teams receive supplementary draft picks as compensation 
for losing major league players to free agency.378  
Increasingly, high-revenue clubs rent out players on the 
verge of free agency to assist in a late season playoff 
run.379  Because these players often sign with a new club 
the following year, those teams able to trade for high-
salaried and soon-to-be free agents receive more than their 
proportionate share of the supplementary picks.380  The 
supplementary picks harm low-revenue clubs by artificially 
changing the draft order of the first 100 selections and 
devaluing subsequent selections.381 
F. Boost Central Fund Revenues 
As previously noted, Central Fund revenues primarily consist of 
national broadcast and licensing fees.382  Since Central Fund 
payments are divided equally among all thirty teams, a boost to this 
pool would do wonders in diminishing the disparities in overall team 
revenue.383  Here are a few suggestions to boost Central Fund 
revenues: 
• More Aggressive MarketingAs the most traditional of all 
the major sports, baseball has been reluctant to jump 
headfirst into the commercial marketplace.  A few years 
ago there was a great deal of backlash when it was 
suggested that advertising patches on uniforms could be 
sold, with the revenue going directly to the low-revenue 
 
 377 See id. 
 378 See Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 41. 
 379 See id. 
 380 See id. 
 381 See id. 
 382 See id. at 59. 
 383 See id. 
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teams.384  Critics of that plan contended that MLB was not, 
and never should be, NASCAR.385  However, the league 
should attempt to expand its sponsorship and licensing 
programs so that Central Fund revenues can increase.  The 
upcoming Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City should 
provide a good blueprint for such an endeavor, since the 
combined marketing efforts of the U.S. Olympic 
Committee and Salt Lake Olympic Committee have netted 
nearly $1 billion through an extremely aggressive 
sponsorship program.386  The Olympics do have the benefit 
of strict rules regarding commercial presence on the field 
of playnone is allowed.387  Therefore, the Olympic 
Movement seems shielded from criticism for turning into 
NASCAR.  Baseball does not have such a rule, as 
demonstrated by Foxs garish and tasteless Virtual Ads 
that were heavily criticized during the World Series.388  If it 
could increase its marketing revenues, MLB would 
undoubtedly have to walk a fine line between maintaining 
the games integrity and pleasing its marketing partners. 
• World Cup RevenuesAt the moment, over 40% of the 
players under contract to Major and Minor League clubs 
were born outside of the United States.389  Because 
 
 384 See Ross Newhan, Ad Idea May Be a Little Patchy, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1999, at D1 
(raising concerns about the overexploitation of advertising opportunities in baseball). 
 385 See id. 
 386 See Lori Buttars, Two More Olympic Sponsors Signed, But They Are the Last, SALT 
LAKE TRIB., Nov. 2, 2001, at D12 (estimating the total marketing revenue raised prior to the 
Games at $896 million). 
 387 See The Olympic Charter, Rule 61. 
 388 See World Series on Fox Needed a Dose of Ritalin, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 5, 2001, at 
C3 (expressing the authors disdain with the virtual ads that ran during the Foxs 
broadcast of the World Series, feeling above all else it demonstrates a disrespect for the 
game); see also Sharon Ginn, Series Ads Create Some Controversy, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
Nov. 2, 2001, at 7C (discussing the criticism of the virtual ads for which there was an 
allowance of eighteen per Series game, ten for MLB marketing partners and five for Fox, 
which mid-way through the Series had to be modified because MLB and Fox realized they 
were jarring); Richard Sandomir, Ads Are Crowding Batters Box on TV, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 1, 2001, at S4 (agreeing with the MLB and Fox decision to remove the ads, finding 
them to be ostentatious). 
 389 Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 45. 
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baseball is played at a very high level in other countries, 
the opportunity for a successful and competitive baseball 
World Cup is great.  As anyone who followed the United 
States Olympic triumph in Sydney can attest, international 
baseball tournaments provide just as much drama and 
excitement as MLBs playoffs.390  Moreover, because 
international revenues are currently funneled through 
MLBs Central Fund, the revenues that such an event 
would generate could be equally distributed to all clubs.391  
Increases in revenues from international events like the 
World Cup would therefore play a role in moderating the 
level of revenue disparity in the industry. 
• Player Memorabilia RequirementAnother way that MLB 
could boost Central Fund revenues is by agreeing with the 
union that a mandatory memorabilia clause be inserted into 
each Uniform Major League Player Contract.  For instance, 
under this requirement each player might be forced to sign 
his hat and jersey after every game and donate the 
memorabilia to the league.  MLB could then partner with 
an online auction site like eBay to sell that merchandise, 
with the resulting revenue going directly into the Central 
Fund. 
CONCLUSION 
The furor over contraction apparently has not taken Selig by 
surprise.392  When he first announced the owners historic plan, he 
confessed, No modern American sport has done this, so understand 
there will be potholes along the way.393    Unfortunately for Selig,  a  
 
 390 See Timothy Guidera, This Baseball Team Will Be Remembered, AUGUSTA CHRON., 
Sept. 28, 2000, at C4 (discussing the United States 2000 Summer Olympic Baseball Team, 
their success in winning the gold medal, their enjoyment while playing, and how above all 
else they were able to bring back to baseball the pure joy of the game). 
 391 Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 24, at 45. 
 392 See Rovell, supra note 251. 
 393 See id. 
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close analysis of contraction reveals that those metaphoric potholes 
could each be the size of the Grand Canyon. 
It is beginning to look more and more like the Twins and Expos 
will be spared.  The Twins recently released copies of their 2002 
home schedule featuring, appropriately, the slogan, Get Em Before 
Theyre Gone.394  Meanwhile, the Expos have signed a lease to play 
at Olympic Stadium next season and are currently exploring the 
possibility of upgrading the venues playing surface.395  These are 
positive signs, since the first step towards truly addressing baseballs 
problems is to forget about contraction.  By doing this, the owners 
and the union can once and for all focus on creating a CBA that each 
side can live with and that addresses baseballs competitive balance 
problems.  Through cooperation from all parties, this can be 
achieved.  After all, in the words of George Will, [b]aseball is not 
Bangladesh.  It can get well by deciding to get well.396 
 
 
 394 See LaVelle Neal III, Not Quite Business as Usual at Dome, MINNEAPOLIS STAR 
TRIB., Nov. 8, 2001, at 1C; Mel Antonen, Teams Trying to Carry On, USA TODAY, 
November 30, 2001, at 19C (discussing the holding period that the potentially contracted 
teams are currently in as they await an announcement as to if they will be able to play this 
upcoming season, the uncertainty making all sales and marketing attempts difficult). 
 395 See Expos Signed 2002 Lease for Olympic Stadium, But Have Escape Clause, 
CANADIAN PRESS, Nov. 30, 2001 (reporting plans to improve the quality of the artificial turf 
at Olympic Stadium), available at http://www.canoe.ca/Slam011130/mlb_mtl-cp.html (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2002). 
 396 See Richard Justice, Squeeze Play, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 11, 2001, at 1 (discussing 
MLBs alternatives to contraction and proposing, as did the Blue Ribbon Panel, that there 
are viable alternatives, namely increasing revenue sharing between the teams and that 
cooperation will be the key to the leagues ultimate fate). 
